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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction is coi lfen ed i ipoi 1 the 1 Jtal i Coi 11 t of Appeals. 1 11 iclei I Jtah Code 
Annotated § 78A-4- i < )3, to hear appeals from the district court involving cases 
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
S I A I EMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue L Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's 
motion to extend the deadline for designation of expert witnesses and for the submission 
of initial expei t \ v itness reports and w hethei the ti ial court erred by striking Ms. Dahl's 
expert witness reports without leave to amend, even thougl 1 trial had not bee n set 
Standard of review. "Trial courts have broad discretion ii i managing the cases 
assigned to their courts." Welsh v Hospital Corp. nfJTtah. ? A 1 n T r r x \ : i f " 
P 3d 791 (qi io1 ii lg Posner v Equity 1 ill ;" In s
 : ige 72< ' "l- i : - •-+/, «,j 2 3 , III 
P.3d 775) . As par t of that discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a l lows 
the trial court to set dates for the comple t ion of discovery and expert discovery. See U tah 
R Civ P 16(1 >)(3) ai i< 1 1 Ii ; ill. R Cv ' 1 " 26 R 1 lie 16 als< > a.i itl: x irizes 1 1 le 1 1 u tl court to 
impose the sanct ions l isted in Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules o f Civil Procedure if the 
par ty fails to obey a schedul ing or pretrial order. Utah R. Civ. T 16(d). Under Rule 37 , 
excluding evidence .is on* : < ) f the sanctions that m a y be imposed on a. par ty w h o violates 
Rule 16. However , before the trial c< >i 1,1 t c ai 1 imj x >se < lisc :< >vei > sai K :1 i.< ms 1 11 1 k si R 1 ile 37, 
the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party "willfulness, bad faith . . . fault, 
or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, f 
9 (citing A/--'v Continental Bating Co., 93$ P.2d 2 71, 274 ( I Jtah 1.997)) Once tl lat 
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I 
finding is made, the choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the 
responsibility of the trial judge. Appellate courts will only disturb a discovery sanction if * 
abuse is clearly shown. Id. (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, 
1f23, 199P.3d957). 
Supporting Authority. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Welsh v. 
Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, If 9, 235 P.3d 791; Posner v. Equity Title Ins. 
i 
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, % 23, 222 P.3d 775; Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement 
Inc., 2008 UT 82, 199 P.3d 957; Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565; 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382, 174 P.3d I; Preston & ^ 
Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Debry v. Cascade Enters., 
879 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Utah 1994); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d 
291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 
1995). 
Statement of Preservation. The issue regarding the Motion to Strike Expert < 
Witnesses and Motion for leave to amend is preserved on the Record at 607, 769, and 
1742 18-31. 
Issue II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Dahl's 
Motion to Extend Factual Discovery which was filed almost eighteen months prior to 
trial and a full year before the pretrial conference in which a trial date was calendared. 
Standard of review. Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts." Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, Tf 9, 235 
P.3d 791; Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As part of that 
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discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows tin '• *.; mt to set dates 
for the completk »i 1 of discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). 
Supporting Authority. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 26, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; Welsh, 2010 I IT App 171; Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 2009 UT App 347, <{ 23, 222 P.3d 775. 
Statement of Preservation. The issue of extending fact discovery is preserved on 
the Record at 393, 395, and 554. 
Issue III. Whether the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees as a sanction 
against Ms. Dahl for filing a motion to extend the deadline for the designation of experts 
and for the submission of initial expert reports. 
Standard of review. Appellate courts give no deference to the trial court's 
determination as to whether attorney fees. Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, \ 8, 221 
P.3d 845. However, "[w]hether a claim was brought in bad faith is a question of fact that 
appellate courts review under a clearly erroneous standard. Edwards v. Powder 
Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, \ 13, 214 P.3d 120; see also Still 
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, \ 8, 122 P.3d 556. The trial court's 
determination that an action lacks merit, however, is a question of law that this court 
reviews for correctness. Edwards, 2009 UT App 185, % 13; Pennington v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). To the extent the trial court awarded attorney 
fees pursuant to its equitable powers, the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable 
awards of attorney fees is abuse of discretion. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, ^  8; Hughes v. 
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ^ 20, 89 P.3d 148. 
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Supporting Authority. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825; Doctor's Co. v. Drezga, 
2009 UT 60, 218 P.3d 598; In re Olympus Constr., L.C., 2009 UT 29, f 8, 215 P.3d 129; 
Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185; 214 P.3d 120. 
Statement of Preservation. The issue of improper award of attorneys fees under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 is preserved on the Record at 947, 1057 and 1741 29-39. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; 
or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions 
of Subsection (1) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 11 
Reproduced verbatim in the addendum. 
Rule 16(b)(3) 
Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition to any 
other pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court, upon its own motion or upon 
the motion of a party, may conduct a scheduling and management conference. The 
attorneys and unrepresented parties shall appear at the scheduling and management 
conference in person or by remote electronic means. Regardless whether a scheduling 
and management conference is held, on motion of a party the court shall enter a 
scheduling order that governs the time: 
to complete discovery. 
Rule 16(d) 
& 
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Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party 
or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a 
party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its 
own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2). 
Rule 26(b)(2) 
Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that 
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The 
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, 
describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information 
not provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. 
On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery 
is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may order discovery from such sources 
if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). 
The court may specify conditions for the discovery. 
Rule 37(b)(2) 
Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered 
under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey 
an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of 
this rule or Rule 35,, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the 
court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are 
just, including the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes 
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or 
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by 
default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or 
mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
Rule 37(f) 
7 
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Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as 
required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be pennitted to use the witness, document 
or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the 
court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 24, 2006, Ms. Dahl was served simultaneously with the divorce 
complaint and an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) that had already been 
entered in favor of her husband, Charles Dahl. On October 27, 2006, Ms. Dahl retained 
Brian Harrison as an attorney to represent her in the divorce matter. The representation of 
Kim Dahl by Brian Harrison in that divorce action was the issue below in this legal 
malpractice case. 
The hearing on whether to grant the TRO was set for November 2, 2006. Prior to 
the hearing Mr. Harrison informed Ms. Dahl that there was insufficient time to prepare 
for the hearing and as a result, he wanted to seek a continuance of two weeks. She told 
Mr. Harrison she would defer to his recommendation. Mr. Harrison then informed Ms. 
Dahl that she need not appear at the divorce hearing set for November 2, 2006. 
It was undisputed that Mr. Harrison, outside of Ms. Dahl's presence and without 
informing Ms. Dahl ahead of time of proposed terms of the stipulation, entered into a 
stipulation at the November 2, 2006 hearing. The terms of the stipulation provided for 
the adoption of the restrictions in the TRO for an indefinite time, including the 
temporary surrender of custody, even though she had been a stay at home mother all of 
the children's lives and even though there was no finding of abuse or neglect. In 
8 
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addition, Mr. Harrison stipulated to additional restrictions thai were not briefed and were 
not before the court on thai day. The additional restrictions included that Ms. Dahl would 
vacate the marital home which she had sole possession of at that time so that Mr. Dahl be 
awarded immediate use of the home and that Ms. Dahl be required to submit to 
supervised visitation, the supervisor being Mr. Dahfs brother. 
Ms. Dahl was removed from the marital home later on November 2, 2006 and not 
permitted to return. Ms. Dahl hired Rodney Parker to replace Mr. Harrison a short time 
after November 2, 2006. At a later hearing before Judge I aylor to request an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter of temporary custody, Judge Taylor concluded among other things 
that the custody order was in place as a result of the stipulation of the parties. He denied 
the request for an evidentiary hearing. The stipulation causer ' \ * \w> a;;u her children 
significant suffering and displaced Ms. Dahl from stable housing, causing her significant 
economic injury. 
On October 11, 2007, Ms. Dahl filed a complaint against Mr. Harrison alleging 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. On November 21, 2007, 
after agreeing to a scheduling order, Mr. Harrison filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Dahfs 
counsel which was resolved by stipulation on February 6, 2008. On January 4, 2008, the 
court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery on April 7, 2008. 
The order set a deadline of May 5, 2008, for Ms. Dahl to disclose any expert witnesses. 
Trial was not scheduled at this time. On April 28,2008, Mr. Harrison submitted a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was later denied. On May 12, 2008, Ms. Dahl 
filed motions with the trial court seeking amendment of the scheduling order. The court 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
held oral argument on the motions to extend discovery on August 7, 2008. The court 
denied Ms. DahFs request to reopen fact discovery. The court extended expert discovery 
until September 8, 2008 for Ms. Dahl to submit her expert disclosures and reports. 
Ms. Dahl submitted her expert disclosures on September 8, 2008 for two legal 
experts, Clark Nielsen and Martin Olsen. Mr. Harrison moved to strike the disclosures 
pursuant to rule 37(f) because the expert reports did not include adequate description of 
the experts' opinions. Ms. Dahl opposed the motion to strike on the grounds that a 
discovery sanction was inappropriate where there had been no attempt by Mr. Harrison to 
meet and confer, and where there was no showing of prejudice, willfulness or bad faith. 
Trial had not been scheduled at this point. 
On December 16, 2008, the court held oral argument on the motion to strike. At 
that hearing Ms Dahl's counsel orally requested that the court receive an amended expert 
report from Martin Olsen and asked alternatively for the court to consider a motion to 
extend time to prepare further detailed disclosures and reports. The court declined to 
receive the amended report and "strongly hinted" that it would not grant a motion to 
extend expert discovery if it were filed. 
On, January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed her second motion for extension of time to 
file amended expert disclosures and reports, or alternatively, to allow her designated 
experts to testify at trial. As of the date of that motion, trial had not yet been set. Ms. 
Dahl argued in support of her affirmative motion for an extension of time and that no 
prejudice would result as a trial date had yet to be set. The Court denied this motion, and 
10 
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awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison on the basis that the motion was frivolous. The 
court set trial for the first time at a pretrial conference on June 30, 2009. 
At the pretrial conference, the court also bifurcated the trial so that issues of 
liability would be tried separately from the issue of causation and damages. A two day 
bench trial was held on October 26 and 27, 2009, limited solely to the issues of liability. 
Following the presentation of evidence, the Court found in favor of Mr. Harrison on each 
of Ms. Dahfs causes of action and dismissed the case. The Court entered its conclusions 
of law and order of dismissal on June 1, 2010 and a final judgment of court costs on June 
21,2010. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff Kim Dahl's husband, Charles Dahl, filed a 
Petition for Divorce in the Fourth Judicial District under case number 064402232. 
(Record at 11.) 
2. Along with the Petition for Divorce, Mr. Dahl filed a Motion for an Ex 
Parte Temporary Restraining Order limiting Ms. Dahl's contact with her children. (Id.) 
3. On October 24, 2006, Ms. Dahl was served with a Complaint for Divorce 
and the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"). (Record at 10.) 
4. At the time she was served, Ms. Dahl had no notice or inclination that Mr. 
Dahl had been planning to file for divorce. (Id.) 
5. Prior to the date she was served with the TRO, Ms. Dahl had never been 
reported by anyone for abusing or neglecting her children, or for giving them medication 
11 
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not prescribed by their physician and father, Charles Dahl, or by any other licensed 
physician. (Record at 9.) 
6. Based upon the unsubstantiated allegations in the affidavits of Charles Dahl 
and Rosemond Blakelock, Mr. Dahl's attorney, representing that permanent and 
irreparable harm may come to the children if the TRO did not issue, the District Court 
entered an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order without notice to Ms. Dahl. (Id.) 
7. The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order prohibited Ms. Dahl from 
removing the children from the temporary care, custody, and control of the Mr. Dahl, or 
removing either child from his or her school. (Id.) 
8. The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order did not order Ms. Dahl to leave 
the marital home. (Record at 9.) 
9. The District Court scheduled an Order to Show Cause on November 2, 
2006 before Commissioner Patton to review the TRO. That hearing was Ms. Dahl's first 
opportunity to be heard on the court's restraining order. (Record at 10.) 
10. After being served with the Complaint and the Temporary Restraining 
Order, Ms. Dahl went to attorney Brain Harrison of Brian C. Harrison, P.C. to discuss the 
papers which had been served upon her. (Record at 9.) 
11. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Harrison told Ms. Dahl that he would 
represent her, but that she needed to deposit a $5,000 retainer with Brian C. Harrison, 
P.C. (Id.) 
12. Ms. Dahl promptly secured the funds for the retainer and delivered them to 
Mr. Harrison. (Id.) 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13. Between the retainer payment and the other money Ms. Dahl was able to 
secure, Ms. Dahl deposited $12,146.05 with Brian C. Harrison, P.C. (Record at 8.) 
14. During one of the initial consultations, Mr. Harrison counseled Ms. Dahl to 
sign up for parenting classes. (Id.) 
15. Mrs. Dahl took the advice of Mr. Harrison and signed up for the classes. 
16. Of utmost concern to Ms. Dahl was the hearing scheduled for November 2, 
(Id.) 
17. When Ms. Dahl discussed the hearing with Mr. Harrison, he told her that he 
could not be ready for the hearing on November 2, 2006 and that it would be continued. 
(Id.) 
18. Mr. Harrison informed Ms. Dahl that because the November 2, 2006 
hearing would be continued, she would not need to appear. (Id.) 
19. Despite Mr. Harrison's representation to Ms. Dahl that she did not need to 
attend the hearing on November 2, 2006, Mr. Harrison entered into a stipulation on Ms. 
Dahl's behalf. Mr. Harrison did so without any further attempt to contact Ms. Dahl 
before or during the hearing, without Ms. Dahl's knowledge or consent, and outside of 
her presence. The stipulation that Mr. Harrison agreed to on Ms. Dahl's behalf adopted 
the restrictions in the TRO pending a new hearing. The stipulation farther adopted 
additional restrictions including removing Ms. Dahl from the marital home and restricting 
her parent time with the children to supervised visitation, the supervisor being Mr. Dahl's 
brother. (Id.) 
(id.) 
2006. 
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20. On November 7, 2006, the District Court Commissioner and Judge signed 
an Order consistent with the terms of the stipulation. (Id.) 
21. After Mr. Harrison entered into a stipulation extending the TRO, removing 
Ms. Dahl from the marital home and restricting her parent time with the children to 
supervised visitation, Ms. Dahl retained Rodney Parker to represent her in the divorce 
action. (Record at 7.) 
22. Mr. Harrison sent portions of Ms. Dahl's file, including privileged 
information, to the martial home, even though he knew that Ms. Dahl did not reside there 
and that she was then represented by Rodney Parker. (Id.) 
23. On or about November 9, 2006, Mr. Harrison sent a final bill to Ms. Dahl 
stating that he had worked on her case for 27 hours between the dates of October 26, 
2006 through November 9, 2006. (Id.) 
24. Ms. Dahl filed the current action on October 11, 2007, alleging breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. (Record at 12.) 
25. Mr. Harrison filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses on November 1, 
2007. (Record at 24.) 
26. After agreeing to a scheduling order, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Ms. Dahl's counsel on November 21, 2007. (Record at 30.) On January 4, 
2008, the court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery on April 7, 
2008. (Record at 144.) The order set a deadline of May 5, 2008, for Ms. Dahl to disclose 
any experts. (Id.) Trial was not scheduled at this time. 
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27. On January 8,2008, oral argument was set for the motion to disqualify to 
occur on March 14, 2008. (Record at 147). This motion was later withdrawn on 
February 6, 2008 by stipulation of the parties. 
28. Ms. Dahl propounded discovery including interrogatories and a request for 
production of documents on April 7, 2008. (See Record at 194). Mr. Harrison then filed 
a Motion for Protective Order requesting that because the discovery could not be 
responded to within the fact discovery period, the court should order that Mr. Harrison 
was not required to respond to the discovery requests. (Id. At 193-94). 
29. On April 28,2008, Mr. Harrison submitted a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which was later denied. (Record at 391, 717.) On May 15, 2008, Ms. Dahl 
filed motions with the trial court seeking amendment of the scheduling order. (Record at 
393, 395,401,409.) The court held oral argument on August 7, 2008, and the court 
denied Ms. DahPs request for further time for fact discovery. (Record at 554.) The court 
did extend expert discovery deadlines, giving Ms. Dahl until September 8, 2008, to 
submit her expert disclosures. (Id.) 
30. Ms. Dahl submitted her expert disclosures on September 8, 2008. Mr. 
Harrison, without any attempt to meet and confer as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a) 
moved to strike the expert disclosures pursuant to Rule 37(f) alleging that the disclosures 
lacked adequate description of the experts' opinions. (Record at 556, 562, 573.) Ms. 
Dahl opposed this motion on the grounds that a discovery sanction was inappropriate 
where there had been no attempt by the parties to meet and confer, and where there was 
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no showing of prejudice (since the matter was not set for trial), willfulness, or bad faith. 
(Record at 607.) 
31. On December 16, 2008, the court held oral argument on the motion to 
strike. (Record at 769.) At this hearing, Ms. Dahl's counsel orally requested that the 
court receive an amended report from Martin Olsen which the court denied. (Record at 
1742 18:9-13; 30:20-31:6.) In addition, Ms. Dahl's counsel asked if the court would 
consider a motion for leave to amend. The court "strongly hinted" that it would deny a 
motion for leave if it were brought. (Record at 1741 38:17-24). The trial court granted 
the motion to strike Ms. Dahl's expert report. (Record at 1742 30:20-31:6). 
32. On January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed a written request for extension of time 
to file the expert disclosures and reports. (Record at 947.) As of the date of that motion, 
trial had not yet been set. Ms. Dahl argued in her affirmative motion for an extension of 
time and that no prejudice would result to Mr. Harrison as trial had yet to be scheduled. 
The trial court denied this motion and awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison even 
though no Rule 11 motion had been served or filed. (Record at 1057.) 
33- On June 30, 2009, the court set the first trial date in this case. (Record at 
1162.) The court also bifurcated trial into two parts—liability would be tried first and the 
issues of causation and damages would follow at a separate trial date. {Id.) A two day 
bench trial on liability issues only was set for October 26 and 27, 2009. (Record at 1400, 
1402.) 
34. Even though trial issues were limited for the first time on June 30, 2009, the 
court did not reopen fact or expert discovery on the limited issues after bifurcation. No 
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fact discovery had been permitted by the court between April 7, 2008 and trial on 
October 26, 2009. (Record at 1162.) 
35. Following the presentation of evidence on October 26 and 27, 2009, the 
court found in favor of Mr. Harrison on each of Ms. DahPs causes of action and 
dismissed the case. (Record at 1718.) The trial court entered its conclusions of law and 
order of dismissal on June 1, 2010 and a final judgment of costs on June 21,2010. 
(Record at 1718,1722.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I: The trial court abused its discretion in granting Mr. Harrison's Motion to 
Strike Expert Witnesses. A trial court's decision to strike expert witnesses is "extreme in 
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and restraint." Welsh v. Hospital 
Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, If 10, 235 P.3d 791 (quoting Berrett v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) (omissions in original). 
The trial court abused its discretion by choosing an inappropriate remedy. In this case, 
Ms. Dahl met the deadline for expert disclosures set by the trial court, a trial date had not 
been set, expert designations could have been amended, and there would have been 
ample time for deposition of the experts and designation of rebuttal experts if needed. 
Before imposing the drastic sanction of limiting evidence, the court should have at the 
very least required the moving party to comply with Rule 37(a) and the duty to meet and 
confer informally before seeking discovery sanctions. Because this case required expert 
testimony, the court's decision to strike the expert witness disclosures was fatal to Ms. 
Dahl's case and essentially gutted her legal malpractice claim. When the court finally set 
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trial and limited the trial issues, the court should have reconsidered the sanction of 
striking expert witnesses and permitted discovery that could have been accomplished in 
the four months preceeding trial. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. DahPs request for an 
extension of time to amend the expert designations and/or permission for expert 
testimony even if the extension of time was not granted. The trial court had the 
discretion to grant the motion, even after an expiration of a stipulated deadline. Further, 
the denial of the motion and exclusion of the expert testimony from the trial was an 
"extreme sanction59 that effectively decided the outcome of the case before it ever went to 
trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, % 17. Because the trial date had yet to be set, plenty 
of time remained to complete the expert reports, conduct the necessary discovery, and 
still allow both sides to be ready for trial. 
This motion was not in essence a motion for reconsideration because the prior 
request had been granted. Even though the court believes that it "hinted" that it would 
deny such a motion, Ms. Dahl had the right to bring the motion in writing and set forth 
her argument for relief. Further, the "hint" by the trial court would not have been enough 
to preserve the issue for appeal. The trial court should have decided the motion on its 
merits, and under Boice, the trial court should have granted Ms. Dahl leave to amend her 
disclosures. See Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565. 
Issue II: The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's motion to 
extend fact discovery. While the rules of civil procedure allow the trial court to set the 
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dates for completion of discovery, this discretion should be exercised in favor of allowing 
the trial court to determine the facts and resolve the issues directly and fairly. 
Because a motion to disqualify counsel for Ms. Dahl covered the bulk of the 
factual discovery period, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant an 
extension once the motion had been withdrawn by Mr. Harrison. The trial court 
improperly imposed a harsh sanction by closing fact discovery over 18 months before 
trial and more than 12 months before a trial date was determined. No prejudice would 
have resulted to Mr. Harrison if the court had granted the motion for extension of time. 
When the court finally set trial and limited the trial issues, the court should have 
reconsidered the denial of fact discovery and permitted discovery that could have been 
accomplished in the four months preceeding trial. 
Issue III: The trial court legally erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison attorneys fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 because this section applies only to causes of action, 
not motions. Even if § 78B-5-825 somehow applied in this circumstance, Mr. Harrison 
had not prevailed on the cause of action at that point, the claims asserted by Ms. Dahl had 
merit, and her cause of action was not brought in good faith. Applying this statute to 
motions would obviate the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that a party like Ms. Dahl must receive prior notice and the opportunity for her to 
withdraw the motion. Mr. Harrison did not comply with Rule 11; therefore he should be 
precluded from seeking sanctions for a motion he deems to be frivolous. 
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under its 
equitable powers. None of the specific equitable exceptions to the general rule that a 
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prevailing party is only entitled to attorney fees when authorized by contract or statute 
apply in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant, Kim Dahl, respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
determinations of the trial court below because the lower court improperly denied her 
motion to amend designation of expert witnesses, struck her expert reports, denied an 
extension of time to conduct fact discovery, and improperly granted an award of 
attorneys fees. For these reasons, Ms. Dahl respectfully requests that this case be 
remanded to the trial court for additional discovery and a new trial on the bifurcated issue 
of liability. 
I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms Pahl's motion to extend the 
deadline for the designation of experts and for the submission of initial expert 
reports and by striking Ms. Pahl's expert reports without leave to amend, even 
though trial had not been set. 
This Court reiterated just last year that "a trial court's discretion to exclude expert 
witness testimony is not absolute. 'Excluding a witness from testifying is . . . extreme in 
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and restraint.'" Welsh v. Hospital 
Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171,110, 235 P.3d 791 (quoting Berrett v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. JUL, 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) (omissions in original). 
Given that trial had not been scheduled, there was ample time for Mr. Harrison to depose 
Ms. Dahl's experts and designate rebuttal experts, if needed, the trial court abused its 
discretion in this case when it excluded Ms. Dahl's experts. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 
171,1f 16 (noting that even though there was a delay in designating experts, the other side 
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would have had time to "depose those experts, designate rebuttal experts, and otherwise 
prepare for trial) (quoting Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, % 10, 982 P.2d 565). 
A. The trial court abused its discretion when it chose an inappropriate sanction 
by striking Ms. Dahl 's Expert Disclosures and Reports. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mr. Harrison's Motion to 
Strike Ms. Dahl's Expert Disclosures and Reports as a discovery sanction almost 11 
months before trial. While it is true that the choice of an appropriate discovery sanction 
is primary the responsibility of the trial judge, this court will disturb that discovery 
sanction if abuse of discretion is shown. Welsh v. Hospital Corp., 2010 UT App 171, |^ 9, 
235 P.3d 791. The recent case of Welsh clearly sets forth the premise that the exclusion 
of expert witnesses is an extreme sanction and effectively decides the outcome of a legal 
malpractice case before ever beginning trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, % 17 (finding 
that the prejudice to the plaintiffs if their experts were excluded would be "potentially 
devastating").1 
This Court has previously stated that "expert testimony may be helpful, and in 
some cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with 
the duties owed by a particular profession." Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 9A3 
P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 
1
 Before the trial court imposed its discovery sanction under Rule 37, the trial court 
should have found Ms. Dahl was willful, acted in bad faith, or used persistent dilatory 
tactics that frustrated the judicial process. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, ^ 9 (citing 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.3d 271, 274 (Utah 1997)). However, as stated 
by this court in Welsh, u[w]e need not resolve the question of willfulness" if "we 
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its 'choice of an appropriate 
sanction.'" Id. (quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 275). 
0 1 
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n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The Preston Court acknowledged that "[i]n some cases, 
expert testimony may be unnecessary where the propriety of the defendant's conduct i s 
within the common knowledge and experience of the layman.'" Id. at 263-64 (quoting 
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). However, the trial court determined 
below that "this is a legal malpractice case which required expert testimony." (Record at 
1446.) Further, the trial court determined that the "failure to present any expert testimony 
was, indeed, fatal to [Ms. Dahl's] claims in this legal malpractice case." (Record at 
1439.) Therefore the failure to present expert testimony on Ms. Dahl's claims of legal 
malpractice rendered the second phase of this bifurcated trial as to the issue of damages 
"unnecessary." (Record at 1713.) 
Knowing that expert testimony in this case would be determinative, the trial court 
abused its discretion and effectively gutted Ms. Dahl's legal malpractice case when it 
imposed the extreme sanction of disallowing expert testimony. This sanction was not 
employed with "caution and restraint" as required by Welsh Id. ^ 10. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion by placing any inconvenience to Mr. 
Harrison in extending discovery ahead of the extreme prejudice to Ms. Dahl. 
This Court in Welsh determined that because the nonmoving party had time to 
depose the experts, designate rebuttal experts, and otherwise prepare for trial, any 
prejudice would be minimized. Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^16. Similarly, Mr. Harrison 
had ample time to depose the two experts listed by Ms. Dahl, designate any rebuttal 
experts, and otherwise prepare for trial. Mr. Harrison would "suffer no prejudice" if the 
trial court had permitted Ms. Dahl's two experts to testify at trial. See id. at *§ 17. 
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However, comparatively the prejudice to Ms. Dahl was completely "devastating" and this 
Court should find, as in the Welsh case, that the trial court abused its discretion by 
striking Ms. DahPs experts without leave to amend their reports. Id. 
The facts of Dugan v. Jones are analogous, in most respects, to the instant case. 
"In determining whether to modify a pretrial order in the interest of justice, the court 
should consider the possible prejudicial effects of its enforcement of the order." Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1244 (Utah 1980). The court in Dugan held that "the trial court 
abused its discretion, under the circumstances of this case, in excluding testimony from 
defendants' experts." Id. In Dugan, the trial court precluded expert witness testimony 
because the defendants had failed to disclose any expert witnesses prior to trial. Id. The 
trial court then found at trial that the lack of expert witness testimony relating to damages 
prevented the court from finding damages. Id. 
The Dugan court reasoned that because the pretrial order to disclose expert 
witnesses was not written down, because the case was not being tried in front of a jury, 
and because there were alternative sanctions that could have been used, the trial court 
abused its discretion in preventing the defendant's expert witnesses from testifying. Id. 
Ms. Dahl did comply with the court ordered date to disclose expert witnesses. 
Like Dugan, there was no jury to be empanelled in this case and the "inconvenience to 
the court . . . [would] not [have] outweigh[ed] the prejudice to [Ms. Dahl], resulting from 
the exclusion of [her] experts." Id. Additionally, there were other sanctions available to 
the trial court beyond striking expert testimony which is critical to prove legal 
o i 
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malpractice. Id; see also Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, f 23, 
222 P.3d 775 (courts have discretion to employ alternative sanctions in lieu of exclusion). 
The court's refusal to allow the timely designated expert witnesses to testify or to 
allow Ms. DaM leave to amend their reports was an abuse of discretion. See Welsh, 2010 
UT App 171,\17. Therefore, this Court should remand this case back to the trial court 
for a new trial on the issue of liability. 
C. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl 's January 23, 
2009 Motion to Allow Expert Witnesses at Trial. 
1. The trial court improperly determined that Ms. Dahl's Motion to Allow 
Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial was a motion to reconsider the 
trial court's previous ruling. 
After the trial court struck her expert witnesses, Ms. Dahl then filed her written 
Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial on January 23, 2009 to ask the 
court for additional time to designate her expert witnesses for trial in order to amend their 
reports. (Record at 947.) This expert testimony was critical to the case. The trial court 
had stricken the experts in response to Mr. Harrison's objections to the sufficiency of the 
opinions in their reports. (Record at 1742 16:21-17:12.) Ms. Dahl sought not to 
designate new witnesses but to amend their designations to more fully comply with Rule 
26 regarding the opinions of the same witnesses. (Record at 1057.) Ms. Dahl's motion 
to extend time for designation of experts would not have caused further delays in the trial 
because the trial date had not been set. 
In ruling on this motion the trial court suggested that the January 23, 2009 motion 
was really a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision on December 16, 
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2008, even though the trial court itself admitted in the hearing on the written motion that 
"this is not a second motion for plaintiff." (Record at 1741 37:8-10.) Ms. Dahl's 
previous motion to extend expert discovery deadlines had been granted by the court on 
August 7, 2008. Ms. Dahl had every right to bring a motion to ask for additional relief 
when she had not been denied previously. 
Further, this January 23, 2009 motion to extend time was asking for different relief 
than Mr. Harrison's motion that was decided on December 16, 2008; therefore, it could 
not be considered a motion for reconsideration. Mr. Harrison moved to strike what had 
previously been designated while Ms. Dahl's subsequent motion asked for leave to 
amend. A motion to strike may be followed by a motion for leave to amend. The first 
does not preclude the second. Given the gravity of this decision, the court should first 
have decided the January 23, 2009 motion to extend expert discovery on its merits not 
based on a procedural determination that the form of the motion was a motion for 
reconsideration. 
2. The trial court should have decided the motion on its merits, and under 
Boice, the trial court should have granted Ms. Dahl leave to amend her 
disclosures. 
Had the court considered the merits of Ms. Dahl's January 23, 2009 motion, the 
trial court should have granted the motion. If the court had granted the January 23, 2009 
motion, there would have been no prejudice to the Mr. Harrison because trial date had yet 
to be set. Plenty of time remained to re-designate expert witnesses, amend the expert 
reports, conduct the necessary discovery, and allow counsel to designate rebuttal experts 
for trial. On the other hand, the extreme exclusion by the trial court was "devastating" 
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and decided the outcome of Ms. DahPs legal malpractice case before ever beginning the 
trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^19. The prejudice to Ms. Dahl in denying her 
motion was not justified by any benefit to the court or opposing party. 
The present situation is analogous to the case of Boice v. Marble where the Utah 
Supreme Court made a distinction between failing to obey a scheduling order and asking 
for leave to designate a new expert. 199 UT 171, % 11. In Boice, the plaintiff had 
designated his physiatry expert prior to the court's deadline. Id. After the deadline, the 
plaintiff sought leave to substitute a new expert after his previous expert had decided not 
to testify. Id. The plaintiff sought leave to substitute two months prior to the trial date. 
Id. The Supreme Court held that the substitution of a new expert two months prior to 
trial did not unfairly prejudice the defendant as there was ample time to depose the new 
expert and prepare rebuttal experts. Id. The Court further stated that even if defendant 
would be harmed by the late designation, the rules allow for a continuance and the trial 
court could have granted that for good cause. Id. 
Under Boice, the Supreme Court found that two months before trial was adequate 
time to designate a rebuttal expert after a new designation by the moving party. See 
Welsh v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171,110, 235 P.3d 791 (justice 
and fairness may require that a trial court allow a party to designate expert witnesses, 
conduct discovery, or perfomi tasks covered by the scheduling order after the expiration 
of the imposed deadline); see also Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, f 10, 982 P.2d 565. The 
court's order denying leave to amend the actual report in this case was over 10 months 
before trial. Since the designation in Boice would "not unfairly prejudice the defendant 
OA 
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as there was ample time to depose the new expert and prepare rebuttal expert", the same 
result should have been reached here where the expert was identified more than fourteen 
months before trial. Boice v. Marble, 199 UT 171, |^ 11. The trial court concluded that 
prejudice would result if Ms. Dahl was permitted to amend her expert witness 
disclosures. (Record at 1742 31:11-16.) However, the trial court did not address the fact 
below that trial had not been scheduled yet and that "prejudice is minimized where the 
opposing party has time to depose those witnesses, designate rebuttal witnesses and 
prepare for trial." Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^16 (citing Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., 
Inc., 2007 UT App 382, ^  26, 174 P.3d 1). As was the case in Welsh, Mr. Harrison "had 
time to depose those experts, designate rebuttal experts and otherwise prepare for trial." 
Id. Therefore, this court should reverse and remand for a new trial. 
In sum, while the trial court had a "commendable desire to move this case 
forward," the forgoing factors, taken as a whole, should constrain this Court to conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in exluding Ms. DahPs expert witnesses from 
trial. See id. ^ f 19. This court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Ms. DahTs 
January 23, 2009 motion to extend time to designate an expert witness for trial and 
remand this case and direct that further discovery and time for designation of witnesses 
be permitted. 
II. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. DahPs Motion to 
Extend Factual Discovery and granted Mr. Harrison's Protective Order. 
The complaint in this case was filed on October 11, 2007. (Record at 12.) On 
January 4, 2008, the court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery 
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on April 7, 2008. Ms. Dahl propounded discovery including interrogatories and a request 
for production of documents on April 7, 2008. Mr. Harrison filed a Motion for Protective 
Order requesting that because the discovery could not be responded to within the fact 
discovery period, the court should order that Mr. Harrison was not required to respond to 
the discovery requests. On May 12, 2008, Ms. Dahl filed a motion to extend factual 
discovery. At a hearing on August 7, 2009, the trial court granted Mr. Harrison's Motion 
for Protective Order and denied Ms. Dahl's motion to extend factual discovery. 
Discovery which will aid in identifying, narrowing and clarifying the issues should 
be liberally permitted. Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2006 UT App 33, f 10, 131 
P.3d 263. The purpose of the rules of civil procedure pertaining to discovery "is to make 
the procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any useless ritual, undue 
rigidities or technicalities." Rahojy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App 350, f 7, —P.3d— 
(quoting Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg I Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, t 7, 121 P.3d 74). 
Additionally, the purpose of the rules pertaining to discovery is to allow the trial court to 
determine the facts and resolve the issues directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible. 
Id. (citing Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, | 8.) 
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on discovery issues for abuse of 
discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^ 59, 150 P.3d 480. As part of that 
discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial court to set dates 
for the completion of discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). However, this discretion 
should be exercised in favor of allowing the trial court to determine the facts and resolve 
the issues directly and fairly. See Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, % 8. 
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In this case, the trial court should have exercised its discretion in favor of allowing 
factual discovery that would properly allow the trial court to determine the facts of this 
case and resolve the issues fairly. Instead, the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
the request to extend factual discovery when no trial date had been set and sufficient time 
remained for factual discovery to be completed. The trial court abused its discretion in 
granting a protective order rather than granting the motion to extend factual discovery. 
The cases in which appellate courts have upheld protective orders and denied additional 
time for discovery have had extreme factual scenarios, nothing like the one at hand. See 
e.g., Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ffi[ 55-56, 222 P.3d 69 (upholding a 
protective order and denying additional discovery because party failed to participate in 
scheduling order and trial was less than two weeks away); 
The trial court abused its discretion by adopting a rigid approach that thwarted the 
uncovering of facts relating to this case. For instance, the trial court, in granting the 
protective order, found that Mr. Harrison had the right to expect Ms. Dahl to work within 
the time frame. (Record 1743 31:20-23.) The trial court also summarily concluded that 
there would be prejudice to Mr. Harrison because if the court granted an extension, he 
would be required to "delay everything" and to answer the interrogatories. (Record 1743 
(Tr: 31:20-23, 32:2-7). However, the court did not mention the extreme prejudice to Ms. 
Dahl in denying the extension of fact discovery. Rather, the trial court overstated the 
prejudice to Mr. Harrison. No trial had been set. Ample time existed to complete fact 
discovery. 
on 
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Additionally, this Court should note that a few weeks after the complaint was filed 
in this case, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion to Disqualify Ms. Dahfs counsel. (Record at 
30.) Oral argument was set for this motion on March 14, 2008. (Record at 147.) 
Counsel for Ms. Dahl understandably held off on its factual discovery efforts once Mr. 
Harrison filed a motion to disqualify counsel for Ms. Dahl. The doctrine of equitable 
estoppel provides that "conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance 
thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Inc., 2005 UT App 
154, f 12, 111 P.3d 829 (quoting United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982)). The delay alone of over 80 days caused by the pending 
Motion to Disqualify should have been grounds to extend the already very abbreviated 
fact discovery deadlines in this case. 
Since fact discovery as scheduled was to close on April 7, 2008, Ms. Dahl had less 
than 30 days to propound written discovery after the Motion to Disqualify was resolved 
and have it due prior to the discovery cut off date. Ms. Dahl's counsel prepared and 
propounded written discovery 60 days after the Motion to Disqualify was resolved. Mr. 
Harrison's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on April 28, 2008, after the close of 
fact discovery. (Record at 163.) The Motion for Summary Judgment was later denied. 
(Record at 717.) On May 15, 2008, Ms. Dahl filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling 
Order to allow additional time for fact and expert discovery. This motion was granted as 
to expert discovery and denied as to fact discovery on August 7, 2008. 
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Counsel for Ms. Dahl represented that due to Mr. Harrison's Motion to Disqualify, 
counsel decided to "wait and see what happens" with the motion. (Record at 1743 13:16-
14:5.) Counsel also noted that after the Motion to Disqualify was withdrawn on February 
6, 2008, there remained only 58 days for fact discovery. (Id. at 15:24-16:7.) Under the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel, Ms. Dahl's counsel reasonably determined to wait on 
initiating discovery in this case while the Motion to Disqualify counsel was pending. 
This coupled with the fact that no trial date had been set in this case and the Motion to 
Disqualify was filed less than 30 days after the complaint was answered constituted good 
cause to adjust the discovery deadlines. 
Under Rule 26, the default discovery timeline for fact discovery is 240 days after 
first appearance by the defendant. Rule 26 Advisory Committee Notes. Mr. Harrison 
filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses on November 1, 2007. (Record at 24.) At the 
very least, due to the intervening Motion for Disqualification, the trial court should have 
implemented the default discovery provision allowing Ms. Dahl 240 days after the Mr. 
Harrison answered to complete fact discovery which would have given the parties 
approximately 90 additional days for discovery. This would have allowed time for the 
discovery Ms. Dahl's counsel propounded to Mr. Harrison to have been answered. 
Instead, the trial court refused to permit any fact discovery following April 7, 2008— 
even though the first trial date was subsequently set for approximately 18 months from 
that date on October 26 and 27, 2009. This case turned on the strength of the claims of 
each party as to the events on November 2, 2006. Ms. Dahl was prejudiced at trial 
because she was not able to discover the facts surrounding Mr. Harrison's claims. 
^1 
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This court should remand this case back to the district court for a new trial on the 
issue of liability in order to allow Ms. Dahl a fair opportunity to discover the pertinent 
facts of this case. The court limited the issues to liability only on June 30, 2009. With 
this very limited focus at trial, the parties could have easily accomplished the needed 
discovery in the remaining 120 days before trial. However, the court abused its 
discretion and refused to reopen discovery, even at that point. 
III. The Trial Court erred by awarding Mr. Harrison $2,400 in attorneys fees for 
Ms. DahPs filing her Motion to Allow Expert Testimony. 
On January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed a second request for extension of time to file 
the expert disclosures and reports, or alternatively, to allow her designated experts to 
testify at trial. Ms. Dahl's first motion to extend the time for designation of experts had 
been granted by the court on August 7, 2008. As of the date of the second motion to 
extend time to amend her designation of experts, trial had not yet been set. The trial 
court denied this second motion, and awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison for the 
reasons Mr. Harrison claimed in his attorney fee motion.2 As a general rule, attorney fees 
may be awarded to the prevailing party only when such action is permitted by either 
2Ms. Dahl notes that the trial court put her in an untenable position. As part of its validation for 
awarding attorney fees, the trial court says it "strongly hinted" during a pretrial conference on 
January 23, 2009, that it would not grant such a motion for extension of time on the expert 
designations. (Record 1741 36:20-24). On the one hand, had Ms. Dahl taken the strong hint and 
not filed her motion, she would not have preserved the issue for appeal. An issue needs to be 
formally presented to the trial court and denied before it can be appealed; otherwise the issue 
would be waived. See Arbogast Family Trsut v. River, 2008 UT App 277, f 10, 191 P.3d 39. On 
the other hand, since the court had apparently decided the issue before having it briefed, Ms. 
Dahl took the risk that presenting the motion would upset the court and be summarily denied. A 
strong hint that a motion will be denied should not bar a party from bringing such a motion or 
expose her to sanction. 
i** 
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statute or contract. Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, ^ 44, — 
p.3d~; Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, ^ 6, —P.3d—; Posner v. Equity Title Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 2009 P.3d 775, \ 26, 222 P.3d 775; Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis, 
Inc. v. Rawlings, 2007 UT 97, ^  5, 175 P.3d 1036. 
Mr. Harrison has not shown that attorney fees were permitted either by statute or 
contract. Mr. Harrison, in his Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, argued that 
attorney's fees could be awarded under one of two options: pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-5-825 or pursuant to the trial court's "inherent equitable power to award reasonable 
fees." The trial court, in awarding attorney fees, stated "I adopt the reasoning found in 
the motion for attorney fees and costs." (Record at 1174 39:1-4). Therefore, the trial 
court awarded the attorney fees pursuant to § 78B-5-825 and/or the court's "inherent 
equitable powers. However, the trial court could not properly award attorney fees under 
either approach. 
A. The trial court erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison attorney fees and costs 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825for a motion. 
The trial court erred when it awarded attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
5-825. Section 78B-5-825 states that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-5-825 (1) (emphasis added). "Whether the trial court properly interpreted the legal 
prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section [78B-5-825] is a 'question of law' 
that we 'review ... for correctness.'" Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ^  8, 
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122 P.3d 556 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,117, 977P.2d 
1201 (holding that statutory interpretation presents a legal question)). 
"According to the plain language of section 78-27-56 [renumbered as section 78B-
5-825], three requirements must be met before the court shall award attorney fees: (1) the 
party must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, 
and (3) the claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith.'5 Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 
UT App 40, f 9, 178 P.3d 922, certiorari denied 189 P.3d 1276 (citing Hermes Assocs. v. 
Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 pertains to causes of action, not motions. 
Ms. Dahl filed a motion, not a "claim" or "action." Accordingly, the trial court 
could not award attorneys fees under this statute. "Action" is defined as "[a] civil or 
criminal judicial proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary 26 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005). 
"Claim" is defined as "[t]he aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable 
by a court" or "(t]he assertion of an existing right" or "[a] demand for money, property, 
or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil 
action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for." Black's Law Dictionary 204-05 
(Abridged 8th ed. 2005). All of the above definitions of action or claim denotes the filing 
of the cause of action or the claim for relief. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Mr. Harrison's motion for 
attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. The court expressly found that the 
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motion and not the claim itself was frivolous.3 In fact, the court had previously denied 
Mr. Harrison's Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim. (Record at 717.) 
The extension of § 78B-5-825 to include motions filed without merit obviates the 
requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which specifically 
designates the prerequisites for sanctions on frivolous filings, including motions. Rule 11 
requires that the moving party serve the offending party with a motion and permit the 
offending party 21 days to withdraw the paper (motion) prior to filing the motion with the 
court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11. If the paper (motion) is withdrawn, Rule 11 precludes a 
sanction from being imposed. In this case, opposing counsel did not notify Ms. Dahl that 
they were seeking Rule 11 sanctions, nor did Mr. Harrison claim Rule 11 sanctions in 
their motion for attorney's fees filed on February 9, 2009. (Record at 986.) Because the 
claim was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith, the Defendant should be precluded 
from seeking a sanction under § 78B-5-825. A vague claim for an attorney fee sanction 
alleging a frivolous motion without compliance with Rule 11 should likewise be denied 
since it denied Ms. Dahl of due process and the opportunity to withdraw her motion. 
Mr. Harrison claimed in his motion for attorney fees that the case of Rohan v. Boseman, 
2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d 753 stands for the proposition that § 78B-5-825 is applicable to the 
filing of motions as well as the filing of claims or causes of action. In Rohan, this court agreed 
with the trial court's award of attorneys fees under the statue when the trial court awarded fees 
for bringing a renewed motion for continuance or voluntary dismissal under the ADA. Rohan, 
2002 UT App 109, *[ 37-38. There is little to no reasoning as to why the attorney fee award was 
upheld or what arguments were made against such a result under § 78B-5-825. No other cases 
since Rohan have applied § 78B-5-825 to a motion. In addition, the facts are distinguishable. 
The plaintiffs motion in the Rohan was filed the day before trial. Id. Here, the motion to allow 
Ms. DahPs expert witnesses to testify was filed ten (10) months before trial and six months 
before trial was even set. 
i * 
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Further, Ms. Dahl denies that her motion was frivolous. As set forth above, the motion 
was necessary to the presentation to her case and was brought six months prior to the 
pretrial date on which the court gave notice of trial. 
2. Ms. Dahl's cause of action was brought in good faith. 
Mr. Harrison has also failed to establish that he prevailed on the cause of action, 
that the claim asserted by Ms. Dahl was without merit, and that the claim brought by her 
was not brought in good faith. First, while Mr. Harrison did prevail on his objection to 
allow Ms. Dahl's witnesses the opportunity to testify at trial, he had not prevailed at trial 
on the cause of action when the attorney fees were awarded. Second, Mr. Harrison 
argued that Ms. Dahl's motion relating to expert witnesses was without merit, not that her 
claims of legal malpractice and breach of contract were meritless. Third, there was no 
finding by the court that Ms. Dahl's claims were brought in bad faith. Fourth, the court 
made no findings that the motion for extension of time to designate experts was brought 
in bad faith. 
For the reasons outlined above, the trial court erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison 
attorney fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Section 78B-5-825 applies 
to claims and actions not motions. Further, Mr. Harrison failed to show, and the court 
failed to make findings on, the three factors necessary for an awarded of fees under this 
statute. If Mr. Flarrison believed he was entitled to fees for Ms. Dahl's motion, he was 
required to comply with Rule 11. Therefore, this court should reverse the award of 
attorneys fees under § 78B-5-825. 
o/: 
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B. The court abused its discretion by awarding attorneys fees under its inherent 
equitable powers. 
To the extent the trial court based its award of attorney fees on its inherent 
equitable powers, it has also abused its discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion 
when it improperly awards attorney fees under its equitable powers. Hughes v. Cafferty, 
2004 UT 22, \ 20, 89 P.3d 148 ("the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards 
of attorney fees is abuse of discretion"). 
Utah case law has recognized a small number of specific equitable exceptions to 
the general rule that a prevailing party is only entitled to attorney fees when authorized 
by contract or statute. These exceptions consist of the following: (1) when a party acts in 
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; (2) in class action cases 
where nonparty class members benefit financially from the successful efforts of only a 
few litigants; (3) when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation of the trust and obtains a 
recovery for all other beneficiaries affected by that violation; (4) where a private party's 
litigation vindicates a strong or socially important public policy (the so called "private 
attorney general" action); (5) where a plaintiffs litigation confers a substantial benefit on 
members of an ascertainable class; (6) when a insurer breaches an insurance contract; (7) 
where a defendant's breach of contract foreseeably causes a plaintiff to incur attorney 
fees in litigation with a third party (the "third-party litigation" exception); and (8) where 
an insurer files a complaint against its own absent insured that would adversely affect the 
interests of an innocent third party. See Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 60 
P.3d 1176,1179 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted) (identifying exceptions 1-
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7); Doctor's Company v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,218 P.3d 598 (Utah 2009) (developing 
exception 8). 
This case is not a class action lawsuit nor has it benefitted the members of an 
ascertainable class. This case has not vindicated a socially important public policy. This 
case is not a lawsuit against a trustee by a beneficiary, nor is it a lawsuit between an 
insurance company and an insured. This case does not involve a breach of contract that 
has caused a party to incur attorneys fees in litigation with a third party. 
The only recognized exception that can be applied to a private dispute that does 
not involve insurance companies and does not affect anyone other than the parties 
involved would be when a party acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons. This exception is not applicable here. Defendant did not argue and 
the court did not find that Ms. Dahl acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons when she filed her second motion to extend time within which to 
designate experts and serve their report. The court did find that the filing was frivolous. 
However, that appears to be based on the conclusion of the court that the motion was 
filed even though the court "strongly hinted" that it would be denied and that the court 
considered the motion to be more of a request for reconsideration of the motion to strike 
theearlier designation of experts. (Record at 1741 38:17-24.) Because the court had not 
previously denied a motion to extend expert discovery, this was not in reality a motion 
for reconsideration. Further, even though a court believes that a designation of an expert 
does not comply with the rules it does not follow that a party is precluded from seeking 
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the opportunity to bring such designations into compliance. In this case, Ms. Dahl did 
just that. 
After her designations were stricken, and nine Ml months before trial was 
convened in this case, she sought leave to amend her designations. The designations of 
experts were later determined to be absolutely necessary to prove Ms. Dahl's claim so the 
motion for leave to amend such could not be frivolous. Further, since such a request had 
not been previously denied, it could not have been vexatious or considered oppressive. 
Because the very narrow exception to the need for a statutory basis for an award of 
attorneys fees did not apply in this case, the court abused its discretion by awarding 
attorneys fees under its inherent equitable powers. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the determinations of the trial court below because the 
lower court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Dahl's motion to extend time to 
designate expert witnesses, in failing to grant an extension to allow Ms. Dahl to conduct 
fact discovery, and in improperly awarding attorneys fees without a statutory basis. Ms. 
Dahl respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial court for additional 
discovery and a new trial on the bifurcated issue of liability. 
i n 
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Respectfully submitted this 2 6 day of January, 2011 
CHRISTENSEN I THORNTON, PLLC 
Wt^S 
.hristensen 
Benjamin K. Lusty 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF was mailed to the following on the ^ 6 ^ day of January, 2011: 
Ben W. Lieberman (11456) 
Law Office of Ben W. Lieberman, PLC 
1371 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
40 
H 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
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UtahRXiv.P. 11: 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations 
to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. 
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party. 
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as 
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have 
a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a 
notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, 
verified or acknowledged signature and the party electronically files the paper, the 
signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected 
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately 
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or 
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other 
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, 
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court 
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney 
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law 
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firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, 
and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an 
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with 
respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct 
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the 
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an 
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and 
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court 
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims 
made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order.. When imposing sanctions, tibe court shall describe the conduct determined 
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to 
the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KIM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. . 
Defendants. 
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[PROPPED] SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
Case No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
The parties have met and conferred in accordance with Rule 26(f)(1). The Court hereby enters 
the following Scheduling Order based upon the parties' stipulation: 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURES: Initial disclosures required under U.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) shall be 
exchanged by the parties by November 19,2007. 
JAN 0 4 2003 yj 
4TH D!STR>C1 I 
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2. DISCOVERY: Discovery is necessary on the following subjects: Plaintiff s claims and 
damages; Defendants' claims and defenses to Plaintiffs claims; and other matters as needed 
a. FACT DISCOVERY: Fact discovery shall be completed by no later than April 7, 2008. 
b. EXPERT DISCOVERY: Expert designations and reports shall be due under Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) as follows: 
i. Designation of expert witnesses is due by Plaintiff on May 5, 2008, and by 
Defendants on June 2,2008. 
ii. Rebuttal reports from both parties are due on or before June 16, 2008. 
iii. The deadline to depose all experts for both parties shall be July 14,2008. 
c. METHODS/LIMITATIONS OF DISCOVERY: The parties may utilize the following 
discovery methods: 
i. twenty Five (25) interrogatories per party, unless otherwise stipulated by the 
parties; 
ii. requests for Admissions, as provided by the Rules; 
iii. requests for Production of Documents, as provided by the Rules; and 
iv. no more than fifteen (15) oral exam depositions, unless otherwise stipulated by 
the parties. 
3. SUPPLEMENTATION: Supplementation to discovery under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(e) shall be due 30 days from the time the party learns that prior disclosures or responses to discovery 
are incomplete or incorrect 
4. AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS: The parties shall have until February 4, 2008, to join 
additional parties or to amend pleadings. 
2 
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5. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE: The parties request a pretrial conference in August 2008. 
6. ALLOCATION OF FAULT: The cutoff date for filing a notice to allocate fault pursuant to 
Rule 9(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is February 4, 2008. 
7. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS: The cutoff date for filing dispositive, or potentially dispositive 
motions is April 28,2008. 
8. SETTLMENT: The potential for settlement at this time is unknown. 
9. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The potential for resolution of this matter 
through the Court's alternative dispute resolution program is unknown at this time. 
10. WITNESS AND EXHBIT LISTS: The final lists of witnesses and exhibits, or objections 
thereto, are due in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4). 
11. TRIAL: The parties will be ready for trial by August 2008.. The estimated length of trial is five 
(5) days. 
12. SERVICE: So long as a hard-copy is sent within 24 hours via U.S. Mail, the parties may serve 
each other through email at the following address: for Plaintiff: ssc@hclawfirm .net; 
bmoss@hclawfirm.net; isteele@hclawfirm.net; and for Defendants: bwl@bmgtrial.com. 
DATED: / / / f/d % 
Slfeve S. Christensen 
Brennan H. Moss 
Jeffrey J. Steele 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED : K/l/f>1 
J&^amin W. Lieberman 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BUEBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Fourth Judicial 
District Court 
APR 2 8 2008 
State of Utah 
FILED Clerk 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KMDAHL, 
Plaintifi; 
v. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C., hereby move the Court for a 
protective order in this matter. In support therefor, Defendants state: 
1. On or about January 4, 2008, the Court entered the Parties' stipulated scheduling 
order in this matter. As stated therein, fact discovery in this matter closed on April 7,2008. 
2. On April 7,2008, the day of the fact discovery cutoff, Plaintiff served her First Set 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents upon Defendants by postal mail and 
e-mail. {See Exhibit A.) Per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants' responses would be 
a n n l Q i 
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due on May 12, 2008, five weeks after the fact discovery cutoff. 
3. Plaintiffs discovery requests are untimely pursuant to the Court's Scheduling 
Order. For Plaintiffs requests to be timely, they had to have been served so that responses were 
due before discovery was complete. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady, 2006 WL 3387176, 
at *1 (W.D. Pa. November 21,2006) (finding that "all discovery initiatives shall be served within 
sufficient time to allow responses to be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based upon the 
same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives served on the last day of discovery to be untimely, 
such that Defendants are not required to respond to the same.); Chevola v. Cellco Partnership, 
2007 WL 3379779, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. November 14, 2007) ([T]he completion date for discovery 
means just that—all discovery must be completed by that date. Hence, interrogatories, as an 
example, must be served more than thirty days prior to the completion date to permit the 
opposing party to respond before the discovery deadline.")?' Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler 
Chrysler Motors Co., LLC, 2007 WL 4409781, at *1 (M.D. Fla. January 16, 2007) (same); 
Brodeurv, McNamee, 2005 WL 1774033, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27,2005)(same); Eplingv. 
UCB Films, Inc., 2001 WL 584355 (D. Kan. April 2, 2001) (same).1 
4. Because Plaintiffs discovery requests were not served to allow ample time for 
Defendants to respond within the fact discovery period, Plaintiffs requests are untimely. See id. 
As such, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for a protective order and order that 
Defendants do not have to respond to Plaintiffs untimely discovery requests. 
• " / / 
1 Copies of these unpublished federal district court decisions are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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Respectfully submitted this £ ( day of April, 2008 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
•jamm W. Lieberman 
"^Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM was hand 
delivered on the 3S day of April, 2008, to the following: 
Steve S. Christensen 
Brennan H. Moss 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
P:\CHents\Harrison, Brian 3010\070i-v. Kim Dahl\Pleadings\Motionand Memo for Protective Order.doc 
< 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KMDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
• Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Respondent Kim Dahl, by and through her counsel of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, in 
accordance with Rules 26 and 34 U.R.C.P., hereby submits her First Request for Production of 
Documents to Defendants, and requests that Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C. 
produce to the offices of Hirschi Christensen, legible copies of all documents and things requested in the 
following Request for Production of Documents within thirty (30) days after service hereof. 
. INSTRUCTIONS 
For the purposes of this Request, the following definitions shall govern these Requests for 
Production of Documents absent clear indication to the contrary: 
1. The terms "you" and "your" refers to Defendant Brian C. Harrison, his employees, 
agents, attorneys, accountants, or any one else acting by through or under the Brian C. Harrision 
.- nnnigg 
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direction; it also refers to Defendant Brian C. Harrison, P.C. its employees, agents, attorneys, 
accountants, or any one else acting by through or under Brian C. Harrision, P.C's direction. 
2. Other terms pertaining to the parties, documents, events, or occurrences referenced in the 
pleadings of the parties shall have the meanings ascribed to them in such pleadings. 
3. The terms "document" or "documents" mean every writing, recording and photograph as 
those terms are defined in Utah R. Evid. 1001 and every database that can be used to generate any 
writing or recording as defined in the Utah Rules of Evidence, and includes legible copies or 
reproductions of any of the foregoing wherever the original is not available or wherever the copy or 
reproduction contains any entry or notation not present on the original or otherwise similarly differs 
from the original, 
4. The term "identify" or "identity" when used with reference to a document(s) shall mean 
to state with respect to each such document: 
a) The title and number of pages of the document; 
b) The date appearing thereon and the date of the document's preparation, if known; 
c) The name(s), address(es), and title(s) of the document's author(s) and signer(s); 
• d) The name(s), address(es), and title(s) of the person(s) to whom the document was 
addressed or distributed; 
e) A further general description of the document so it can be distinguished from 
other similar documents; and 
f) The physical location of the document and the name(s) and address(es) of the 
custodian(s) thereof. 
2 
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5* The term "identify" or "identity" when used with reference to a person shall mean to state 
with respect to each such person: 
a) The person's name, address, and telephone number; 
b) The present employer, occupation, and business address of the person; 
c) If the person is not a natural person, the type of entity and the state under whose 
authority it exists; and 
d) Any other information helpful in ascertaining the location or identity of the 
person. 
6. The term "relating to" shall mean pertaining to, referring to, concerning, reflecting, 
describing, evidencing, constituting, or in any way logically or factually connected with the matter 
discussed. 
7". The phrase "state the factual basis" means to provide a detailed summary of the facts, 
information, and matters which you presently believe support or tend to support such claim, allegation 
or statement. Such summary should include, when applicable, appropriate references to dates, times, 
persons and documents. 
8. The term "person" shall mean any natural person and any firm, corporation, association, 
partnership, or other legal, business or government entity, and shall include the plural as well as the 
singular. 
9. "All," "every," and "each" shall be construed as all, every, and each.-
10. The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed disjunctively or conjunctively as 
necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be 
construed to be outside of its scope. 
3 
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11. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice-versa. 
12. Singular masculine pronouns have a non-restrictive meaning and are used to refer to a 
person, as defined herein, or either or neither gender. 
13. For each and every request for production of documents, please provide true and correct 
copies, of which all portions are clear,, concise, and legible. 
14. If you are entitled to and do elect to produce documents pursuant to Rule 33(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of identifying the documents as requested by a particular 
Interrogatory, you are required to produce such documents in the manner set forth in Rule 33(d) and are 
required to produce every original, every copy of the original where the original is not available, and 
every non-identical copy of the document in your possession, custody or control. 
15. To the extent that you object to any interrogatory, set forth the reasons therefore. Should 
your objection be made to only part of any interrogatory, you must completely answer the remainder of 
that interrogatory. If you claim privilege as grounds for not answering any interrogatory you must make 
the claim expressly and describe the nature of the information or communication not disclosed in a 
manner that wiU enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege. Therefore, as to each 
interrogatory or part thereof which you refuse to answer on the basis of a claim of privilege, provide the 
following information: 
a) The privilege(s) claimed; 
b) Specific facts upon which each claim of privilege is based; 
c) If a document is involved, identify that document; and 
d) If the privilege concerns an oral communication, identify that communication. 
4 
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16. For each and every interrogatory or request, include at the end of each answer the specific 
name of each and every person who has direct and personal knowledge of said answer; and provide the 
home and business address and telephone number for such person or persons. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify any communications that you had with Mrs. Dahl while 
you acted as her counsel. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the 
communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify any communications that you had with other persons while 
you acted as her legal counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the 
communication, the place the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the 
communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify any communications that you have had with Rosemond 
Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place 
the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you have had with Dr. Dahl. 
Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the communication took place, the people 
present, and the subject matter of the communication 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted that 
have involved Rosemond Blakelock. . . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or consulted in 
that relate to Dr„ Charles Dahl. 
5 
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TNTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you 
entered into the "Stipulation" without Mrs. Dahl5s knowledge or consent. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 8: Identify the basis and the reasons that you recommended to Mrs. 
Dahl to sign up for anger management and parenting classes. . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you 
told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not need to 
appear. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to put 
Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted in 
paragraph 40 of your Answer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. Dahl 
violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's counsel.. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are 
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages are a 
result of her own actions. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mis. DahTs damages were 
caused by intervening causes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. DahTs damages were 
the product of circumstances over which you had no control. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. DahTs claims are 
barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches. 
6 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed to 
mitigate her damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18; Identify all times in which you have been covered by malpractice 
insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which you were covered, and the name of the malpractice 
carrier. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Produce all documents relating to your representation of Kim Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Produce all documents relating to every agreement, document, or other 
writing that was executed by the parties, or either of them, to engage the employment of Brian C. 
Harrison or Brian C, Harrison, P.C. for Kim Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Produce all documents relating to your claim that you had authority to 
represent Mrs. Dahl in case number 064402232. . 
REQUEST NO. 4: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl consented to your 
entry into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl authorized you to 
your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Produce all documents, notes, memoranda, or other writings relating to case 
number 064402232. 
REQUEST NO. 7; Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and Dr. 
Charles Dahl, or her claim. 
7 
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REQUEST NO. 8: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and 
Rosemond Blakelock, or her agent, which related to Mrs. Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Produce all documents relating to any conversations between you and Mrs. 
Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to Mrs. 
Dahl for your legal counsel and representation. 
REOUESTNO.il; Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients against 
parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all the files that relate to your answer to interrogatory number 6 
above. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have had, you 
have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any 
other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory number 10. 
DATED this f^ day of April, 2008. 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
STEVE S. CHEJSTENSEN 
BRENNANH.MOSS 
000182 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OOOlSl 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 1 of 17 
V^tlavv; 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d Paget 
Not Reported mF.Supp.24 2006 WL 3387176 (W.D.Pa.) 
(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176) 
H 
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady 
W.D.Pa.,2006. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,W.D. Pennsylvania. 
ERBE ELEKTROMEDIZIN GMBH, Erbe USA, 
Inc., and Conmed Corporation, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Dr. Jerome CANADY and Canady Technology, 
LLC, Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 05-1674. 
Nov. 21,2006. 
Gabriela I. Coman, Laurence E. Fisher, Philip G. 
Hampton, II, Dickstein Shaprio LLP, Washington, 
DC, Leland P. Schermer, Leland Schermer & Asso-
ciates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John G. Powers, Han-
cock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs. 
Brad R. Newberg, Christopher F. Winters, Newberg 
& Winters, Vienna, VA, Timothy R. Dewitt, Alex-
andria, VA, Daniel M. Darragh, Mark A. Grace, 
Cohen & Grigsby P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defend-
ants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER 
AMBROSE, Chief District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel Re-
sponse to its Discovery Requests, or in the Altern-
ative, Extend the Discovery Deadline to Permit the 
Response to the Already-Served Requests. (Docket 
No. 98). By way of background, on March 9, 2006, 
counsel, in compliance with this Courts local pat-
ent rules, filed a Rule 26(f) report with a proposed 
fact discovery completion date of October 27, 2006. 
(Docket No. 25). On October 27, 2006, the last day 
of fact discovery, Plaintiffs propounded discovery 
upon Defendants. Defendants object to this discov-
ery arguing that it is untimely and requested a tele-
phone conference with this Court. (Docket No. 
103). During a telephone conference regarding the 
timeliness of said discovery, I granted Plaintiffs 
leave to file a Brief supporting their position. 
(Docket No. 96). Thereafter, I called counsel back 
and requested that Plaintiffs indicate in their Mo-
tion a time line of the discovery that they had taken 
in this case. 
I first note that Plaintiffs failed to supply this Court 
with a time line of the discovery they had taken in 
this case. See, Docket No. 98.Defendants, however, 
responded to the same indicating that prior to Octo-
ber 27, 2006, Plaintiffs only discovery initiatives 
were served on March 10, 2006. (Docket No. 103, 
p. 2). In other words, between March 10, 2006, and 
the last day of discovery, October 27, 2006, 
Plaintiffs propounded no other discovery in this 
case. Id. 
In support of their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs cite 
to two cases out of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.™1! am not persuaded by the ra-
tionale of the cases. Further, I find them to be dis-
tinguishable from the within matter. Specifically, 
the cases cited by Plaintiffs were out of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and not subject to this 
court's local patent rules, whereas the within matter 
is governed by the Local Patent Rules for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania. 
FN1. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are 
Mines v. City of Phil, No. 93-3052, 1994 • 
U.S.Dist LEXIS 9776, at *2 (E.D.Pa. July 
18, 1994), and Laurenzano v. Lehigh Val-
ley Hospital, Inc., No. 00-02621; 2003 
U.S.Dist LEXIS 13258, at *6-7 (E.D.Pa. 
July 28,2003). 
This Court's Local Patent Rules provide a Model 
Scheduling Order, which sets forth the following: 
(10) The parties shall complete fact discovery by, 
all interrogatories, depositions, requests for admis-
sions, and requests for production shall be served 
within sufficient time to allow responses to be com-
pleted prior to the close of discovery. 
See, United States District Court for the Western 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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pendix C, f 10 (emphasis added). According to (W.D.P&) 
their Rule 26(f) Report, counsel used the above 
Model Scheduling Order in preparing their Rule END OF DOCUMENT 
26(f) Report. See, Docket No. 25.Thus, there can be 
no doubt that counsel was aware that "complete" 
means just that-that all discovery initiatives shall be 
served within sufficient time to allow responses to 
be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based 
upon the same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiat-
ives served on the last day of discovery to be un-
timely, such that Defendants are not required to re-
spond to me same. 
Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, that if such ini-
tiatives are determined to be untimely, this Court 
extend the discovery deadline to permit the re-
sponses to the already served initiatives. (Docket 
No. 98). I decline to grant such relief. According to 
Defendants, the initiatives propounded upon them 
include 71 document requests, 8 interrogatories, 
243 requests for admissions, 9 notices of personal * 
depositions, and a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of depos-
ition listing 62 categories. (Docket No. 103, p. 2). 
This is an extensive amount of 
discovery .^Plaintiffs offer no reason for why 
they waited until the last day of discovery to serve 
the same. Moreover, I believe that such extensive 
initiatives would not be completed within 30 days. 
As a result, the discovery period for this case would 
be extended well beyond the time period reasonably 
contemplated by the local patent rule and this 
Court. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
is denied 
FN2. According to Defendants, it com-
prises 98% of Plaintiffs' discovery initiat-
ives. (Docket No. 103, p. 1). 
*2 THEREFORE, this 21st day of November, 2006, 
after careful consideration and for the reasons set 
forth within, it is ordered that Plaintiffs' Motions to 
Compel (Docket No. 98) is denied 
W.D.Pa.,2006. 
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady 
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Chevola v. Cellco Partnership 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Tampa Division. 
Sandra CHEVOLA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 
Defendant. 
No. 8:06-cv-1312-T-30MAP. 
Nov. 14,2007. 
James E. Aker, Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen 
& Ginsburg, PA, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff. 
Gregory Alan Hearing, Thompson, Sizemore & 
Gonzalez, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant 
ORDER 
MARK A. PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs Mo-
tion to Compel (doc. 31). The motion, filed two and 
a half months after the discovery cutoff date, asks 
this Court to compel responses to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories and production of documents 
in response to Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fifth 
Request to Produce. This motion is untimely and is 
therefore denied. 
This district follows the rule that the completion 
date for discovery means just that-aZ/ discovery 
must be completed by that dateMiddle District Dis-
covery (2001) at § LF.l (emphasis in rule). Hence, 
interrogatories, as an example, must be served more 
than thirty days prior to the completion date to per-
mit the opposing party to respond before the dis-
covery deadline. Id If the parties agree to conduct 
discovery after the Court's discovery deadline^ they 
cannot expect the Court to resolve their post-
deadline discovery disputes. Id. Moreover, the 
Court expects the parties to address discovery dis-
putes promptly-before the discovery deadline 
passes or soon thereafter. See Pushko v. Klebener, 
2007 WL 2671263 (M.D.Fla.2007) ("Motions to 
compel must be brought in a timely manner."); AB 
Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Transport 
Logistics, Inc., 2007 WL 1362632 *1 
(S.D.Fla.2007) ("[A] motion to compel filed more 
than two months after the discovery cutoff is 
clearly untimely."); see also Suntrust Bank v. Blue 
Water Fiber, LP., 210 F.R.D. 196, 200-201 
(E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing cases from various 
districts citing general principle); Sales v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 632 F.Supp. 435 
(N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed after the 
close of discovery was untimely). 
The Defendant asserts that it timely responded to 
Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (served on 
May 24, 2007), her Third Request to Produce 
(served on June 14, 2007), and her Fifth Request to 
Produce and First Set of Interrogatories (both 
served on June 27, 2007).S'ee Defendant's Response 
to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, doc. 51, at 12. 
However, the Plaintiff made no objection to the dis-
covery responses until September 11, 2007-nearly a 
month and a half after the July 27, 2007, discovery 
cutoff. While the delay between September 11, 
2007, and the filing of this motion on October 15, 
2007, is fairly attributable to negotiations between 
the parties and the Defendant's request for addition-
al time to consider the Plaintiffs arguments, there is 
no justification for Plaintiffs failure to make any 
objection prior to September 11, 2007. Accord-
ingly, it is 
ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (doc. 31) is DENIED. 
DOISIE and ORDERED. 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Chevola v. Cellco Partnership 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 3379779 (MJD.Fla.) 
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Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors 
Co., LLC 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Tampa Division. 
JIM BOAST DODGE, INC., d/b/a Bob Boast 
Dodge, a Florida Corporation, Plaintiff 
v. 
DAIMLER CHRYSLER MOTORS COMPANY, 
LLC f7k/a Chrysler Motors Corporation, a 
Delaware corporation, Defendant 
No. 8:05-CV-1999-T-30MAP. 
Jan. 16, 2007. 
Named Expert: Joseph F. Roesner 
William G. Osborne, William G. Osborne, P.A., 
Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff. 
C. Everett Boyd, Jr., Dean Bunch, Sutherland, As-
bill & Brennan, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for Defend-
ant. 
ORDER 
MARK A. PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel Proper Responses to Plaintiffs 
Second Request to Produce (doc. 25) and Defend-
ant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by Plaintiffs 
Proposed Expert (doc. 21). A hearing was held on 
the matter on January 16,2007. 
This district follows the rule that the completion 
date for discovery means just that-a// discovery 
must be completed by that dateMiddlz District Dis-
covery (2001) at § I.F.1 (emphasis in rule). Hence, 
requests for production, as an example, must be 
served more than thirty days prior to the completion 
date to permit the opposing party to respond before 
the discovery deadline./*/.; see alsoFED. R. CIV. P. 
34(b). If the parties agree to conduct discovery after 
the Court's discovery deadline, they cannot expect 
© 2008 Thomson/West, No Clar 
Pagel 
the Court to resolve their post-deadline discovery 
disputes. Id. Moreover, the Court expects the 
parties to address discovery disputes promptly-be-
fore the discovery deadline passes or soon there-
after. See Ellison v. Windt, 2001 WL 118617 
(M.D.Fla.2001) (motion to strike filed after discov-
ery deadline untimely); see also Suntrust Bank v. 
Blue Water Fiber, LP., 210 F.R.D. 196, 200-201 
(E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing cases from various 
districts citing general principle); Sales v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 632 F.Supp. 435 
(N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed after the 
close of discovery was untimely). 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Proper Responses 
to Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (doc. 25) 
is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by 
Plaintiffs Proposed Expert (doc. 21) is DENIED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
3. Plaintiffs Expert Report is due January 30, 2007. 
4. Defendant's Expert Report is due February 13, 
2007. 
5. No other deadlines set forth in the Court's Case 
Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 12) are 
affected by this Order. 
DONE AND ORDERED. 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors 
Co., LLC 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 4409781 (M.D.Fla.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Erbe Elekrromedizin GmbH v. Canady 
W.D.Pa.,2006. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,W.D. Pennsylvania. 
ERBE ELEKTROMEDIZIN GMBH, Erbe USA, 
Inc., and Conmed Corporation, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Dr. Jerome CANADY and Canady Technology, 
LLC, Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 05-1674. 
Nov. 21,2006. 
Gabriela I. Coman, Laurence E. Fisher, Philip G. 
Hampton, II, Dickstein Shaprio LLP, Washington, 
DC, Leland P. Schermer, Leland Schermer 8c Asso-
ciates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John G. Powers, Han-
cock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs. 
Brad R Newberg, Christopher F. Winters, Newberg 
& Winters, Vienna, VA, Timothy R Dewitt, Alex-
andria, VA, Daniel NL Darragh, Mark A. Grace, 
Cohen & Grigsby P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defend-
ants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER 
AMBROSE, Chief District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel Re-
sponse to its Discovery Requests, or in the Altern-
ative, Extend the Discovery Deadline to Permit the 
Response to the Already-Served Requests. (Docket 
No. 98). By way of background, on March 9, 2006, 
counsel, in compliance with this Court's local pat-
ent rules, filed a Rule 26(f) report with a proposed 
fact discovery completion date of October 27, 2006. 
(Docket No. 25). On October 27, 2006, the last day 
of fact discovery, Plaintiffs propounded discovery 
upon Defendants. Defendants object to this discov-
ery arguing that it is untimely and requested a tele-
phone conference with this Court. (Docket No. 
103). During a telephone conference regarding the 
timeliness of said discovery, I granted Plaintiffs 
leave to file a Brief supporting their position. 
© 2008 ThomsonAVest. No 
Page 1 
(Docket No. 96). Thereafter, I called counsel back 
and requested that Plaintiffs indicate in their Mo-
tion a time line of the discovery that they had taken 
in this case. 
I first note that Plaintiffs failed to supply this Court 
with a time line of the discovery they had taken in 
this case. See, Docket No. 98.Defendants, however, 
responded to the same indicating that prior to Octo-
ber 27, 2006, Plaintiffs only discovery initiatives 
were served on March 10, 2006. pocket No. 103, 
p. 2). In other words, between March 10, 2006, and 
the last day of discovery, October 27, 2006, 
Plaintiffs propounded no other discovery in this 
case. Id. 
In support of their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs cite 
to two cases out of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.^II am not persuaded by the ra-
tionale of the cases. Further, I find them to be dis-
tinguishable from the within matter. Specifically, 
the cases cited by Plaintiffs were out of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and not subject to this 
court's local patent rules, whereas the within matter 
is governed by the Local Patent Rules for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania. 
FN1. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are 
Mines v. City of Phil, No. 93-3052, 1994 
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9776, at *2 (EJD.Pa. July 
18, 1994), and Laurenzano v. Lehigh Val-
ley Hospital, Ina, No. 00-02621; 2003 
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13258, at *6-7 (E.D.Pa. 
July 28,2003). 
This Court's Local Patent Rules provide a Model 
Scheduling Order, which sets forth the following: 
(10) The parries shall complete fact discovery by, 
all interrogatories, depositions, requests for admis-
sions, and requests for production shall be served 
within sufficient time to allow responses to be com-
pleted prior to the close of discovery. 
See, United States District Court for the Western 
dm to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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District of Pennsylvania Local Patent Rules, Ap-
pendix C, i[ 10 (emphasis added). According to 
their Rule 26(f) Report, counsel used the above 
Model Scheduling Order in preparing their Rule 
26(f) Report. See, Docket No. 25.Thus, there can be 
no doubt that counsel was aware that "complete" 
means just that-that all discovery initiatives shall be 
served within sufficient time to allow responses to 
be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based 
upon the same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiat-
ives served on the last day of discovery to be un-
timely, such that Defendants are not required to re-
spond to the same. 
Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, that if such ini-
tiatives are determined to be untimely, this Court 
extend the discovery deadline to permit the re-
sponses to the already served initiatives. (Docket 
No. 98). I decline to grant such relief. According to 
Defendants, the initiatives propounded upon them 
include 71 document requests, 8 interrogatories, 
243 requests for admissions, 9 notices of personal 
depositions, and a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of depos-
ition listing 62 categories. (Docket No. 103, p. 2). 
This is an extensive amount of 
discovery.^Plaintiffs offer no reason for why 
they waited until the last day of discovery to serve 
the same. Moreover, I believe that such extensive 
initiatives would not be completed within 30 days. 
As a result, the discovery period for this case would 
be extended well beyond the time period reasonably 
contemplated by the local patent rule and this 
Court. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
is denied. 
FN2. According to Defendants, it com-
prises 98% of Plaintiffs1 discovery initiat-
ives. (Docket No. 103, p. 1). 
*2 THEREFORE, this 21st day of November, 2006, 
after careful consideration and for the reasons set 
forth within, it is ordered that Plaintiffs' Motions to 
Compel (Docket No. 98) is denied. 
W.D.Pa.,2006. 
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady 
Not Reported in RSupp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176 
(W.D.Pa.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Epling v. UCB Films, Inc. 
D.Kan.,2001. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, D. Kansas. 
Willard D. EPLING, Plaintiff 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC., fife/a UCB Cello, Inc., Defend-
ant 
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC., Defendant 
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC., Defendant. 
Nos. 98-4226-RDR, 98-4227-RDR, 00-4062-RDR. 
April 2,2001. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ROGERS. 
*1 These cases are presently before the court upon 
the following motions: (1) plaintiffs' petitions for 
review of magistrate's order dated August 7, 2000 
FN1; (2) plaintiffs' petitions for review of magis-
trate's order dated August 31, 2000; (3) plaintiffs' 
petitions for review of magistrate's order dated 
September 22, 2000; (4) plaintiffe' petitions for re-
view of magistrate's order dated January 24, 2001; 
and (5) plaintiff Hladky's petition for review of ma-
gistrate's order elated January 31, 2001. Having 
carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties, the 
court is now prepared to rule. 
FN1. In connection with this motion, the 
parties have filed several other motions. 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike de-
fendant's amended motion to file surreply. 
The defendant has filed a motion for the 
court to disregard plaintiffe' response to 
defendant's surreply. The court has now 
read both the surreply and the response to 
the surreply. Little purpose would now be 
served in granting these motions. Accord-
ingly, the court shall deny both of these 
motions. The court, however, certainly 
does not wish to encourage the filing of 
surreplies and responses to surreplies. In 
addition, the court warns plaintiffe' counsel 
that leave to file a response to a surreply is 
necessary prior to filing such a pleading. In 
this instance, the court will waive that re-
quirement, but this requirement should be 
complied with in the future. 
As the court has explained in the past, these cases 
have long and tortured histories. This is indeed re-
markable because the cases are actually quite 
simple. These cases involve allegations of refusal to 
hire. Actions containing such allegations are usu-
ally among the quickest and easiest in the area of 
employment discrimination. Discovery is generally 
simplified. The motions presently under considera-
tion clearly indicate that these cases have not fallen 
into the quick and simple category. These cases 
have been beset with problems from the outset The 
instant motions suggest that the parties, particularly 
the plaintiffs, fail to understand how the discovery 
process should work* The following comments have 
some application here: "Courts have long under-
stood that uie administration of justice will be 
gravely jeopardized unless the discovery and dis-
closure systems are largely self-executing. The re-
sources of the courts would be taxed upon endur-
ance if more than a tiny percentage of discovery or 
disclosure proceedings generated disputes that 
judges were forced to resolve." 7 Moore's Federal 
Practice, § 37.23 (3d ed.2000). 
An exhaustive and exhausting review of the record 
reveals considerable bickering and acrimony 
between counsel. It is clear that the magistrate has 
been confronted with unusually contentious coun-
sel, and we commend him on the enormous re-
straint he has exercised in presiding over these 
cases. The court hopes that counsel will make every 
© 2008 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt Works. 
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effort in the future to work together to prepare these 
cases for trial or final disposition. 
The court shall now provide some background on 
these cases. For many years, Dupont, Inc. and 
Flexel, Inc. operated a cellophane manufacturing 
plant in Tecumseh, Kansas. In 1996, Flexel closed 
the plant and terminated all of its employees. UCB 
Films, Inc. purchased the plant and began seeking 
employees in 1997. Adecco, an employment 
agency, acted as agent for UCB in the hiring pro-
cess by providing administrative testing and em-
ployment services. Willard Epling and Paula 
Hladky are husband and wife. They had previously 
worked at the Tecumseh plant for a number of 
years as coating operators. Each applied for the po-
sition of coating operator, UCB did not offer a job 
to either one. 
The court's standard of review concerning a magis-
trate judge's determination of a nondispositive issue 
is whether the decision has been shown to be 
"clearly erroneous or contrary to law."28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1)(A); FedJELCiv.P. 72(a). The moving 
party must show that the magistrate's order is 
"clearly erroneous or contrary to tew "Hutchinson 
v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir.1997). The 
"clearly erroneous" standard requires that the court 
affirm me decision of the magistrate unless "on the 
entire evidence [the court] is left with the definite 
conviction that a mistake has been 
<x>mxmttQ&" United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Ocelot Oil 
Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 1458, 1462 
(lOmCix.1988). 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AU-
GUST 7, 2000 ORDER 
*2 On August 7, 2000, the magistrate issued a fifty-
seven page order concerning a number of discovery 
disputes. Plaintiffs seek review of almost every ad-
verse ruling contained in that order. Some of the 
objections raised by the plaintiffs concern key is-
sues in the discovery process, i.e., the scope of the 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
discovery of the defendant's employment records, 
while others refer to very specific and sometimes 
inconsequential matters. 
The court does intend to address the issues raised 
by the parties, but in the interests of time, the dis-
cussions will be limited. 
Defendant's Motions for Protective Orders 
Plaintiff served a subpoena duces tecum on Shirley 
Martin-Smith, the owner of Adecco, requesting that 
she produce nine categories of documents relating 
to the employment applications of all individuals 
who applied for employment with UCB from July 
through December 1997. The defendant sought a 
protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to quash 
the subpoena requests. UCB argued that the docu-
ments should not be produced because it had own-
ership and control over them. Plaintiffs responded 
that UCB did not have standing to object to a sub-
poena served on a third party. 
The magistrate agreed with the arguments made by 
the plaintiffs. The magistrate denied the defendant's 
motions for protective orders. The magistrate, 
however, failed to address whether plaintiffs were 
entitled to sanctions. Plaintiffs contend in this mo-
tion that the court should now award fees and ex-
penses to them. The defendant suggests that the 
plaintiffs are not entitled to fees and expenses be-
cause its position was "substantially justified." 
The court finds that this issue should be remanded 
to the magistrate for consideration of whether attor-
ney's fees and expenses should be awarded to the 
plaintiff. The court believes that the magistrate 
simply overlooked this issue. We believe that the 
magistrate should have the first opportunity to con-
sider it since he is thoroughly familiar with the 
background of the motions for protective order. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Responses to Defend-
ant's Objections to Duces Tecum Deposition Sub-
poenas and Notices 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt Works. 
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In April and early June 1999, plaintiffs served de-
position notices and subpoenas duces tecum on Jirn 
Oldham, Bob Morris, Jeanne Hippe and Larry 
Montgomery, four management employees of UCB. 
UCB objected to the document requests contained 
in the notices/subpoenas on the grounds that they 
were unintelligible, overbroad, vague, ambiguous, 
unduly burdensome and irrelevant. UCB also objec-
ted to the notice/subpoena served on Montgomery 
because it did not afford UCB thirty days to re-
spond to the document requests. In response, 
plaintiffs filed motions to compel the production of 
the requested documents and sought permission 
from the court to reopen the four depositions i£ and 
when, such documents were produced. Both parties 
sought sanctions against the other. 
In his order, the magistrate overruled the majority 
of UCB's objections and ordered the production of 
documents pertaining to the hiring of coating oper-
ators from July 1997 to the present In addition, the 
magistrate granted plaintiffs' request to reopen the 
depositions of Oldham, Morris and Hippe for ques-
tioning concerning the forthcoming coating operat-
or documents, but denied the request to reopen 
Montgomery's deposition. The magistrate denied 
plaintiffs' request to reopen Montgomery's depos-
ition because they had not provided him with the 
thirty days necessary to produce documents as re-
quired by Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(5) and 34. Finally, the 
magistrate denied the parties' cross-motions for 
sanctions. 
*3 Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in. re-
fusing to reopen Montgomery's deposition and in 
refusing to award expenses in connection with the 
filing of the motions to compel. Plaintiffs assert 
that they should have been allowed to reopen Mont-
gomery's deposition because they would have had 
the necessary documents if the defendant had pro-
duced those documents for the other depositions. 
They further argue that they did not take contrary 
positions concerning the scope of their discovery 
requests. Thus, they contend mat they were entitled 
to fees and expenses in connection with the prepar-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
Page 3 
ation of responses to defendant's objections to 
duces tecum subpoenas and the retaking of the de-
positions of Oldham, Morris and Hippe. 
In denying the plaintiffs' requests to reopen Mont-
gomery's deposition, the magistrate ruled as fol-
lows: 
Plaintiffs did not provide Montgomery with the re-
quisite thirty days to provide the documents. While 
the Court has ruled that this failure to give the re-
quisite notice relieved Defendant of producing the 
requested documents at his deposition, Defendant 
still had the obligation to object and/or produce the 
documents within the tnirty-day time period. Since 
Defendant did timely serve objections to the Mont-
gomery requests and the Court has overruled those 
objections, Defendant must still produce the docu-
ments (as limited by Plaintiffs to the individuals 
hired for the Coating Operator positions). The 
Court does not find, however, that Defendant has 
the obligation to re-produce Montgomery for his 
deposition since Defendant had no obligation in the 
first place to produce the documents at his June 14, 
1999 deposition. The Court will therefore deny 
Plaintiffs' requests to reopen Montgomery's depos-
ition. 
In denying sanctions to the plaintiffs, the magistrate 
noted that the plaintiffs had taken contrary posi-
tions as to the scope of information sought, i.e., at 
the time of depositions, plaintiffs claimed they were 
requesting information pertaining to all applications 
for all open positions, while in their reply briefs to 
the motions to compel, they claimed to have sought 
information pertaining only to the hiring of coating 
operators. The magistrate indicated that he would 
have agreed with the defendant that plaintiffs' re-
quests were overbroad if plaintiffs had continued to 
insist that they were entitled to all applications for 
all positions at the plant. The magistrate found in 
plaintiffs' favor on the motions to compel only be-
cause he determined that plaintiffs had narrowed 
their requests in the reply briefs. In sum, the magis-
trate found it unjust to impose sanctions against the 
defendant because of the contrary positions taken 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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by the plaintiffs as to the scope of the document re-
quests. 
The court has carefully evaluated the record, the 
magistrate's order concerning these issues, and the 
arguments of the parties. The court does not find 
that the magistrate's decisions were clearly erro-
neous or contrary to law. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Dis-
covery of Specific Documents 
*4 In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motion to compel 
disclosure and discovery of specific documents. In 
particular, the motions sought production of a 
spreadsheet prepared by Gina Berti, former office 
manager of Adecco, and a "client file" maintained 
at Adecco's office. Plaintiffs also sought to reopen 
Berti's deposition if, and when, the court ordered 
these documents to be produced. 
In his order, the magistrate ordered discovery of 
both the spreadsheet and the "client file" upon the 
condition that the information in each be limited to 
plaintiffs' prospective employing unit, the coating 
department. To ensure the limitation on the scope 
of discovery, the magistrate permitted UCB to re-
dact or remove any information from these docu-
ments that concerned positions outside the coating 
department In addition, the magistrate ordered 
Bertfs deposition to be reopened for purposes of 
questioning her about coating department informa-
tion contained in these documents. The magistrate 
refused to award sanctions to either of the plaintiffs 
concerning these motions to compel. 
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in (1) 
limiting the scope of discovery; (2) not imposing 
judicial oversight over defendant's redaction of doc-
uments; and (3) not awarding expenses in connec-
tion with the filing of the motions to compel. 
The court shall first consider the scope of discovery 
issue. Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate has un-
duly restricted discovery contrary to established 
Tenth Circuit law. Plaintiffs contend that they are 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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entitled to discovery of all information regarding 
individuals who applied for jobs at the Tecumseh 
plant. The defendant had originally argued that the 
scope of discovery should be limited to include 
only the applicants for coating operator positions. 
The magistrate rejected the arguments of both sides 
and determined that discovery would encompass all 
positions within the coating department, not just the 
coating operator positions. The issue of the appro-
priate scope of discovery arises frequently in the 
motions for review filed by plaintiffs. 
The scope of discovery "is limited only by relev-
ance and burdensomeness.'Wea/ifee v. Norton, 621 
F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir.1980). Discovery in em-
ployment discrimination cases depends heavily 
upon the particular circumstances of the case. A 
court may establish appropriate limits in order to 
balance the needs and rights of both plaintiff and 
defendant The Tenth Circuit has not, as suggested 
by plaintiffs, adopted a policy of always allowing 
plant-wide discovery in employment discrimination 
actions. See Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 
F.2d 178 (10th Cir.1973) (in disparate impact case, 
Tenth Circuit affirms district court's order limiting 
discovery to single store where plaintiff employed 
rather than permitting broader discovery companyr 
wide to all stores). Rather, the Tenth Circuit has re-
cognized that district courts have broad discretion 
in discovery matters, and have examined the relev-
ance and the burdensomeness of lii& request In the 
context of investigating an individual complaint of 
disparate treatment, such as exists in the instant 
cases, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that discov-
ery may appropriately be limited to employment 
units, departments and sections in which employees 
similarly situated to plaintiff are employed. James 
v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th 
Cir.1979) (Umiting discovery in gender discrimina-
tion case to plaintiffs department); see also HaseU 
horst v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 10 
(D.Kan. 1995) (discovery limited to employing 
unit); Earley v. Champion International Corp., 907 
F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.1990) (limiting discovery in 
Title VII cases to employing unit); Marshall v. 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 
(5th Cir.1978) (where individual case of disparate 
treatment is alleged, focus in discovery should be 
on employing unit or work unit). To justify the 
court's consideration beyond the employing unit or 
work unit, the plaintiff must show a more particu-
larized need and TelQvmce.Haselkorst, 163 F.R.D. 
at 11. 
*5 The court does not find the magistrate's decision 
to limit discovery to the coating department clearly 
erroneous. The court finds that the magistrate prop-
erly concluded that plaintiffs had not shown a par-
ticularized need and relevance for the plant-wide 
discovery. In sum, the court finds no basis to the 
objections offered by the plaintiffs. 
The court also does not find that the magistrate's 
decision not to impose any judicial oversight over 
the defendant's redactions of the spreadsheet and 
client file was clearly erroneous. The court is in 
agreement with the defendant that this is a matter 
that can be managed by the parties. 
Finally, we shall address the issue of sanctions. 
This presents an interesting question. The facts are 
not in dispute. The motion filed by plaintiff Hladky 
was entitled "Motion to Compel Disclosure of Spe-
cific Documents and for Sanctions."The motion and 
accompanying memorandum, however, failed to ad-
dress the issue of sanctions. The motion filed by 
plaintiff Epling did not mention sanctions either in 
its title or anywhere hi the motion or accompanying 
memorandum. Under these circumstances, the ma-
gistrate determined that plaintiffs had not requested 
sanctions. In addition, he determined that sanctions 
should not be awarded because he did not grant the 
motions in their entireties. 
Sanctions shall be allowed when a motion to com-
pel discovery is granted or if the requested discov-
ery is provided after the filing of the motion, unless 
the court finds that the motion was filed without the 
movant making a good faith effort to obtain the dis-
covery, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure 
was substantially justified, or that other circum-
Page5 
stances make the award of expenses unjust 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(A). Expenses may be appor-
tioned among the parties in a just manner where the^ 
motion to compel is grant in part and denied in part. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). 
Given the language of Rule 37(a)(4)(A), the court 
does not agree with the magistrate that a party 
needs to request sanctions when filing a motion to 
compel under Rule 37. There is a presumption in 
favor of expense shifting sanctions under Rule 
37(a)(4)(A). Unless an exception applies, the rule 
provides that sanctions should be applied. Accord-
ingly* we do not see that the rule requires a request 
or argument for sanctions. Nevertheless, the court 
does not find the magistrate's decision not to award 
sanctions clearly erroneous. If a motion to compel 
discovery is granted in part and denied in part, the 
court may apportion expense shifting sanctions 
among parties "in a just manner." Fed.R.Civ.P. 
37(a)(4)(C). The motions filed by the plaintiffs 
were granted in part and denied in part. The magis-
trate declined to enter sanctions. This court does 
not find that this decision was clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Dis-
covery and for Sanctions 
In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motions to compel dis-
closure and discovery of interrogatories and re-
quests for production of documents to defendant. 
The majority of the defendant's objections to 
plaintiffs' discovery requests focused on the afore-
mentioned dispute over the scope of discovery, i.e., 
whether plaintiffs were entitled to discover inform-
ation regarding all applicants for all positions at 
UCB from July 1997 to the present The defendant 
also objected to the number of interrogatories pro-
pounded by each plaintiff because they exceeded 
the number permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a). In 
their motions, plaintiffs again requested sanctions 
for filing the motions. 
*6 The magistrate once again held that discovery 
was limited to information pertaining to plaintiffs' 
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prospective employing unit, the coating department. 
He further ruled mat the number of interrogatories 
for both plaintiffs exceeded the number permitted 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He estim-
ated that the number of interrogatories propounded 
by Epling, including subparts, ranged from 25 to 
168 interrogatories, while the number propounded 
by Hladky ranged from 21 to 89 separate interrog-
atories. He ordered plaintiffs to select twenty-five 
from those already propounded to resubmit to the 
defendant. In addition to his general rulings, the 
magistrate made numerous determinations on the 
scope of the individual requests for production of 
documents. Finally, he denied plaintiffs' request for 
sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). 
In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magistrate 
erred in (1) limiting plaintiffs' discovery to inform-
ation pertaining to their prospective employing 
unit, the coating department; (2) determining that 
the interrogatories exceeded the number allowed by 
Rule 33 and requiring them to repropound only 
twenty-five interrogatories; (3) denying several of 
their requests for production of documents; and (4) 
denying their request for sanctions. 
The court has carefully considered all of the argu-
ments raised by the plaintiffs. We find no merit to 
any of them. The court finds that the magistrate 
carefully and properly ruled on each of the afore-
mentioned matters. The court does not find that any 
of these rulings were clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs'Motions to File Amended Complaints 
In July 1999, plaintiffs sought to amend their com-
plaints to add retaliation claims and to amend their 
age discrimination claims to include allegations that 
they both sought "any job" at the Tecumseh plant. 
The magistrate denied these motions as untimely. 
In December 1999, plaintiffs sought leave to file 
second amended complaints to add UCB, Inc. as a 
defendant. Epling also sought leave to amend to 
add four new plaintiffs. The magistrate also denied 
the motions to amend as untimely. He further 
denied motions to add UCB, Inc. as a defendant as 
futile. In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the ma-
gistrate erred in denying their motions to amend. 
Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the magistrate failed 
to consider whether the defendant would suffer any 
prejudice as a result of granting either motion to 
amend. 
While leave to amend "shall be freely given when 
justice so requires,"Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the decision 
"is within the discretion of the trial court."Zem7/z 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 
321, 330 (1971)."[A] district court acts within the 
bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to 
amend for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Preju-
dice to the opposing party need not be shown 
2l$o.nFirst City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft 
Sales, Inc., 820F.2d 1127,1133 (10th Cir. 1987). 
*7 After considering all of the facts surrounding the 
motions to amend filed by both plaintiffs, the court 
does not find that the magistrate's decisions to deny 
the motions to amend based on untimeliness were 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The court be-
lieves the magistrate thoroughly examined the is-
sues and reached a decision within the bounds of 
his discretion. Given this decision, the court finds it 
unnecessary to address the rulings made by the ma-
gistrate concerning the futility of the proposed 
amendments. Moreover, the court notes that recent 
events have rendered portions of the motions to 
amend moot. The court has denied motions to dis-
miss in two cases filed by the plaintiffs after these 
cases that raised many of the allegations contained 
in the motions to amend. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Determine Sufficiency of Re-
sponses to Admissions 
On June 16, 1999, plaintiffs served requests for ad-
mission upon the defendant The deadline for 
serving discovery requests was June 1.5, 1999. In 
August 1999, plaintiffs sought to determine the suf-
ficiency of the defendant's responses to the requests 
for admissions. The defendant objected to the re-
) 2008 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt Works. 
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quests for admissions, arguing that they were un-
timely served The magistrate agreed. The magis-
trate denied (he plaintiffs' motion to determine the 
sufficiency of" the responses to the requests for ad-
missions. The magistrate determined that the re-
quests for admissions were a form of discovery and 
that they were untimely because they had been 
served after the discovery deadline. The magistrate 
stated that, in order to be timely, the requests 
needed to be served on or before May 13, 1999, so 
that responses could be filed prior to the discovery 
deadline. The magistrate also granted defendant's 
request for sanctions. 
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in find-
ing the requests; for admissions untimely and in im-
posing sanctions. Plaintiffs assert that requests for 
admission are not discovery tools and were, there-
fore, not subject to the discovery deadline estab-
lished by the magistrate. Plaintiffs further argue 
that sanctions should not have been imposed be-
cause past practices in this court and precedent 
from other jurisdictions supported the position 
taken by them before the magistrate. 
The question of whether discovery deadlines apply 
to requests for admission is the subject of much dis-
pute. Compare Jarvis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 161 
F.R.D. 337, 339 (N.DMiss.1995) (requests for ad-
mission are a form of discovery and are therefore 
subject to the discovery deadline) with O'Neill v. 
Medad, 166 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.Mich.1996) 
(requests for admissions are not general discovery 
device and therefore are not subject to discovery 
deadlines) and Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 124 
F.R.D. 614, 615 (W.D.Tenn.1989) (same) and with 
Kershner v. Beloit Corp., 106 F.R.D. 498, 499 
(D.Maine 1985) (requests for admissions are sub-
ject to discovery deadline but should be answered 
even if untimely unless opposing party shows some 
prejudice). 
*8 Having reviewed mis contradictory precedent, 
none of which comes from the Tenth Circuit or the 
District of Kansas, the court is persuaded that the 
decision of the magistrate was not clearly erroneous 
or contrary to law. The court, however, does find 
that the magistrate's decision to award sanctions 
was clearly erroneous. The magistrate found the ar-
guments of the plaintiffs frivolous and disingenu-
ous. We cannot agree. The state of the law on this 
issue is clearly unsettled. The court finds that the 
arguments of the plaintiffs were substantially justi-
fied. We believe that the imposition of sanctions 
under these circumstances was inappropriate. See 
Bieganek v. Wilson, 110 F.R.D. 77, 78 
(N.D.I11.1986). Accordingly, the court shall vacate 
the award of sanctions to the defendant on this is-
sue. 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Extension of Expert Disclos-
ure and Discovery Deadline 
In June 1999, plaintiffs moved to extend the expert 
disclosure deadlines by sixty days. The magistrate 
denied the motion. The court does not find that this 
decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 
PLAINTIFF HLADKY'S PETITION FOR RE-
VIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF AUGUST 
31,2000 
In response to the magistrate's order of August 7, 
2000, the defendant produced approximately 
20,000 pages of documents to plaintiffs. The de-
fendant photocopied these documents and provided 
them to plaintiffs in eight large boxes. Plaintiffs 
complained about the method of the defendant's 
production. On August 31, 2000, the magistrate 
held a hearing to address plaintiffs' complaints. At 
that time, plaintiffs argued that Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b): 
(1) required the defendant to organize and identify 
documents to correspond with the categories in 
plaintiffs' document requests; and (2) produce ori-
ginal documents rather than copies. The magistrate 
denied plaintiffs' complaints, finding that the de-
fendant had adequately complied with the require-
ments of Rule 34(b). The magistrate found no merit 
to the arguments raised by the plaintiffs. Plaintiff 
Hladky contends that the magistrate erred in reach-
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ing this decision. 
The court does not find the decision of the magis-
trate clearly erroneous. The court fails to find, 
based upon the information presented, that the doc-
uments produced by the defendant were not pro-
duced as they were kept in the ordinary course of 
business. In addition, the court finds nothing in 
Rule 34 that requires that a party produce originals 
rather than copies. In sum, plaintiffs petition for re 
view shall be denied 
p L A r N T I F F S » p E T I T 1 0 N F 0 R R E V I E W 0 F M A 
GISTRATE'S ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 
2000 
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate ruled 
that the appropriate scope of discovery was the 
coating department of the Tecumseh plant for the 
time period from July 1997 through the present. 
The magistrate also ruled that the defendant did not 
have standing to object to or quash the subpoena 
duces tecum served by plaintiffs on Shirley Martin-
Smith. Plaintiffs had previously served a subpoena 
duces tecum on Martin-Smith requesting all applic-
ation documents of all individuals who applied for 
any positions at the Tecumseh plant during the time 
period from July 1997 through December 1997. On 
or about September 11, 2000, plaintiffs issued an 
amended subpoena duces tecum on Shirley Martin-
Smith. Plaintiffs requested all application docu-
ments for all positions for the time period from My 
1997 through the present The defendant responded 
with a motion to enforce the magistrate's August 
7th order. 
*9 The magistrate granted the defendant's motion to 
enforce. The magistrate held that while plaintiffs 
were allowed to once again serve their deposition 
notice on Martin-Smith, they were not permitted to 
obtain documents concerning all positions at the 
Tecumseh plant because discovery had been limited 
to the coating department, plaintiffs' employing unit. 
'In this motion, plaintiffs contend 'that "the magistrate 
erred in limiting the subpoena to documents con-
cerning the coating department. Plaintiffs contend 
that they should have been allowed to proceed on 
the requests of the prior subpoena (with an expan-
sion of the discovery time frame as established in 
the magistrate's August 7th order) because the ma-
gistrate had ruled that the defendant had no stand-
ing to quash the subpoena. 
This motion again raises the scope of discovery' is-
sue. Again and again, plaintiffs have suggested that 
discovery should be expanded to the entire plant 
because "all hiring decisions between My 1997 
and the present have been made by the human re-
sources managers Michael Machell and Jenne 
Hippe under the direct supervision of UCB vice 
president Joseph Wilbanks."As correctly pointed 
out by the defendant, plaintiffs have never cited to 
any portion of the record to support the quoted ma-
terial Moreover, the defendant has repeatedly cited 
to evidence suggesting that the quoted material has 
no basis in fact. 
Once again, the court does not find that the magis-
trate's decision was clearly erroneous. The magis-
trate has demonstrated a thorough understanding of 
these cases and the issues involved. Accordingly, 
this motion shall also be denied. 
PLAINTIFFS* .MOTION FOR REVIEW OF MA-
GISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANUARY 24, 2001 
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate held 
that the defendant was entitled to expenses, includ-
ing attorney's fees, incurred in responding to 
plaintiffs' motions to determine the sufficiency of 
the responses to their requests for admissions. On 
January 24, 2001, the magistrate awarded sanctions 
to the defendant in the amount of $2,390.48. In this 
motion, plaintiffs object to the amount awarded. 
With the court's decision reversing the magistrate's 
award of sanctions, the court finds that this motion 
is moot 
) 2008 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S Govt Works. 
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PLAINTIFF HLADKVS PETITIONS FOR RE-
VIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANU-
ARY 31, 2001 
On January 12, 2001, plaintiff Hladky filed a mo-
tion to take the noticed depositions of Joe Gaynor 
and Joe Wilbanks telephonically. The defendant op-
posed the plaintiffs motion and filed a motion for 
protective order. On January 31, 2001, the magis-
trate denied plaintiffs motion and granted defend-
ant's motion. The magistrate determined that (1) 
plaintiff had not met her initial burden of demon-
strating a legitimate reason for taking the depos-
ition by telephone; and (2) telephonic depositions 
were not appropriate due to the complexity of the 
case and number of documents requested. 
In her petitions for review, plaintiff contends that 
the magistrate erred in denying her motion to take 
the depositions of Wilbanks and Gaynor by tele-
phone. Plaintiff argues initially that there was no 
need for her to state a legitimate reason for the need 
to take a deposition by telephone because the need 
was obvious, i.e., to save costs. Plaintiff further 
contends that the legal and factual bases for deny-
ing her motion wisre inaccurate. 
*10 Rule 30(b)(7) provides that "the court upon 
motion may order mat a deposition be taken by 
telephone."As a general rule, this court believes 
that telephonic depositions should be broadly per-
mitted. We are not convinced as suggested by the 
magistrate that a litigant must affirmatively state a 
reason for the taking of a deposition by telephone. 
.The court notes that in Cressler v. 
Neuenschwander, 170 F.R.D. 20 (D.Kan. 1996), a 
case relied upon by the magistrate, Judge Saffels 
stated that a "party seeking to depose a witness 
telephonically must present a legitimate, reason for 
its request "Cressfer, 170 F.RD. at 21. While we 
agree in substance with this statement, we are not 
persuaded that each case requires the statement of a 
reason because the purpose for taking a deposition 
by telephone is obvious in most cases, i.e., the sav-
ings of time and costs. In this case, where plaintiff 
sought to take the depositions of individuals who 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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. were located in Atlanta, Georgia, we believe that 
the purpose was readily evident. Accordingly, the 
court finds the magistrate's decision to deny 
plaintiffs motion for this reason clearly erroneous. 
Once a motion to take a deposition by telephone is 
filed, the burden shifts to the other side to show 
why the depositions should proceed in the tradition-
al manner. Cressler, 170 F.R.D. at 21. Here, the de-
fendant suggested that these depositions should not 
be taken by telephone because of the complexity of 
the case and the number of documents requested by 
the plaintiff. The magistrate agreed. Based upon in-
formation presently before the court, we cannot say 
that the magistrate's decision was clearly erroneous.. 
Accordingly, this motion shall also be denied. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' pe-
titions for review of the magistrate's order of Au-
gust 7, 2000 (poc. # 132 in No. 98-4226 and Doc. # 
136 in No. 98-4227) be hereby granted in part and 
denied in part On remand, the magistrate shall (1) 
consider whether sanctions should be awarded to 
plaintiffs in connection with defendant's motions 
for protective orders and (2) vacate the award of 
sanctions to defendant in connection with plaintiffs' 
motions to determine sufficiency of responses to 
admissions. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Hladky's 
petition for review of the magistrate's order of Au-
gust 31, 2000 (Doc. # 155 in No. 98-4226) be 
hereby denied 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' peti-
tions for review of the magistrate's order of 
September 22, 2000 (Doc. # 165 in No. 98-4226) be 
hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' peti-
tions for review of the magistrate's order of January 
24, 2001 (Doc. # 228 in No. 98-4226) be hereby 
denied as moot. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Hladky's 
petitions for review of the magistrate's order of 
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January 31, 2001 (Doc.56 and 57 in No. 00-4062) 
be hereby denied. . . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion 
to strike defendant's amended motion to file sur-
reply (Doc. # 186 in No. 98-4226) by hereby denied 
*11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's 
motion to disregard plaintiffs' response to defend-
ant's surreply (Doc. # 211 in No. 98-4226) be 
hereby denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
D.Kan.,2001. 
Epling v. UCB Films, Inc. 
Not Reported in RSupp,2d, 2001 WL, 584355 . 
(D.Kan.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PRO.VO DIVISION 
KM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby 
move this Court for an Order amending the Scheduling Order so that all discovery deadlines will be moved 
back three months. The grounds for this motion, as more folly set forth in the in the accompanying 
Consolidated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion to Amend the 
Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are that Plaintiff needs 
more time to seek responses to her outstanding discovery and to take the deposition of the Defendants. 
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DATED this _lJi;r day <H (viav, .'008. 
HlRSC "1II CM K1STENSEN, FLI C 
r£^& ^ 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNAN H. MOSS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
SCHEDULING ORDEK wx, scut via 11 .S Mail and e-mail on the 12th day of May, 2008, to the 
following: • 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com 
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Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
Hmscm CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
g i , i i. •"—:—=i ' —————— «J-iJ—:—' • " " "' ~ a s " ' • — 
KIMDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER 
DISCOVERY 
Civil No, 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, and 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) does hereby move this Court for an Order allowing for further discovery prior to its 
detennination of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The grounds for this motion, as more fully 
set forth in the accompanying Consolidated Memorandum in Support of tlie Motion for Further Discovery, 
Motion to Amend tlie Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are 
that further discovery and depositions will expose tlie facts and illuminate the issues presented in 
Defendants' Motion for Summaiy Judgment This Motion is also supported by the Declaration of Brennan 
H. Moss. " . . 
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DATED this / £ day of May, 2008. 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNAN H. MOSS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. Ihereby certify that a trae and accuralt- a>py „i PI .AINTII'F'N MOTION FORFURTHER 
DISCOVERY was sent via U.S. Mail and e-mail on thel2th day of May, 2008, to the following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com • 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HIRSCHICHEISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KMDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
-
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF BRENNAN H. 
MOSS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycpck 
1. I am currently counsel of record for Plaintiff Mrs. Dahl and have personal knowledge of the matters 
set forth herein. 
2. On April 7,2008, Mrs. Dahl served upon Defendants discovery requests consisting of 
interrogatories and request for production of documents. 
3. On April 25,2008, Defendants served upon counsel for Mrs. Dahl a Motion for Summary Judgment 
and a Motion for a Protective Order protecting them from having to answer discovery. 
4. The discovery propounded upon defendants relates to the issues raised in their motion for summary 
judgment 
5. Mrs. Dahl. propounded the following interrogatories: 
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a. IN rERRQGATQRl NO. 1: l.lentily any communications thatyouhad with Mrs. Dahl 
while you acted as her counsel. Include in your answer the date o 1 tne communication, the; ..i i ne 
communication tt n >k place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication 
b. INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify any commit K <• - .- - .a >*• 
persons while you acted as her legal counsel which related to Mr; b r 'viwk u: your answer the date of 
the communication, the place the communication took pldu\ flu \n oph piescnt. .md \Uh Mibin't matter of 
the communication. 
c. ^TERRQGATORY NO. J ^-•i-tv n=
 ;„ ..mcations that you have had with 
Rosemond Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, 
the place the eommuiucatiot i it x •!> place,, the pw )ple present, .and the subject matter of the communication. 
d. INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you ha vt had with hi. 
• i • '• nv:wer the date of the communication, the place the communication took place, the 
people present, and the subject matter of the communication 
e. INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted 
that have involved Rosemond Blakelock. •. • ' 
f: INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or 
OOJlSUlted L- Ulu! ".i-H: = -..i.U:; D:ihl. • "" 
g. INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation 
that you entered into the "Stipulation" without Mrs. Dahl's knowledge or consent. 
h. INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identic UK nasi ..M - : .-•.•• .„ . -D 
Mrs. Dahl to sign up for anger management and parenting classes. 
2
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i. INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation 
that you told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not 
need to appear. 
j . INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to 
put Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted 
in paragraph 40 of your Answer. 
k. INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. 
Dahl violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's 
counsel.. 
1. INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons vou claim that Mrs. DahPs claims 
are barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands. 
m. INTERROGATORY NO. 13; Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages 
are a result of her own actions. 
n. INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages 
were caused by intervening causes. 
o. INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages 
were the product of circumstances over which you had no control 
p. INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims 
are barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches. 
q. INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed 
to mitigate her damages. 
3 
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r. I N T E R R O G A T O R Y N O . 18: Identify all times m which you have been covered b y 
malpractice insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which, you were covered, and the name of the 
malpractice cnrriiT.
 m . , 
6. Mrs. Dahl propounded the following request for production of documents upon Defendants 
a. R E Q U E S T N O , ) » roduce all documents relating to your representation of Kim Dahl. 
b . R E Q U E S T N O . ^ * i': * >duce all documents relat ing to ever ) .agreement, document, or 
other writing that was executed b y the parties, or either of them., to engage t h e employment of Brian C. 
Harrison or Jint: •.• - i,,l"( tor Kim Dahl, • ' ' - . . 
c. R E Q U E S T N O . 3 : Produce all documents relat ing to your claim that you had 
authority to t epresent Mrs , Dah l in case number 064402232. 
d. R E Q U E S T N O . 4 : Produce all documents relating to your C L M ; , IUI : MS.,. »: . »:. 
ii entry i nt< > the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2 , 2 0 0 6 , 
e. R E Q U E S T N O . 5: Produce all documents relating to your c l a m 1:1 lat Mi s Dahl authorized 
you to your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on N o v e m b e r 2 ,2006 , 
£ R E Q U E S T N O . 6: Product all documents, notes mt'inonindii. oi other w ritings relating 
to case number 064402232. • 
g. R E Q U E S T N O , 7: Produce ail documents relating to any communicat ions be tween you 
and Dr. Charles Dahl , or her claim. 
11 R E Q U E S T N O . 8: Produce all documents relat ing to any communica t ions between you 
and Rosemond Blakelock, or he r agent, which related to Mrs. Dahl . 
i. R E Q U E S T N O . 9: Produce all documents relat ing to any conversat ions be tween you 
and Mrs. Dahl. 
000338 
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j . REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to 
Mrs. Dahl for your legal counsel and representation. 
k. REQUEST NO. 11: Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients 
against parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
1. REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all the files that relate to your answer to interrogatory 
number 6 above. 
m. REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have 
had, you have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl. 
n. REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, 
or any other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl. 
o. REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory 
number 10. 
7. In' addition to the discovery propounded on April 7,2008, Mrs. Dahl would like to take the 
testimony of the Defendants to ask questions relating to their conversations with Mr. Dahl, Mr. Dahl's 
attorney, and the issues presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. Answers to the above discovery will facilitate a fair trial by the fiill disclosure of all relevant 
testimony and evidence. 
9. I certify under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this / ^ day of May, 2008 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Brennan H. Moss 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DECLARATION OF BRENNAN H. MOSS 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY was sent via U.S. Mail 
and e-mail on th.j 1 ..'th day of May, 2008, to llw (ol). iwi HJJ 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com 
6 0UU3b6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HIKSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KMDAHL, 
. Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSOLIDATED 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER 
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, 
MOTION TO AMEND THE 
SCHEDULING ORDER, AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
PlaintiffKim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby 
submit the following Consohdated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion 
to Amend the Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, 
L THE COURT SHOULD AMEND THE SCHEDULING ORDER TO ALLOW FOR 
MORE DISCOVERY 
Pursuant to Rule 26(f) (1), the parties met and conferred regarding following scheduling 
deadlines. As part of the meeting, the parties agreed that all fact discovery would be completed no later 
than April 7, 2008. When Plaintiff entered into the stipulation, it was overly optimistic about the time 
frame in which discovery could be completed. However, due to Motions filed.in this case, and the time • 
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constraints In otliei uises, ii is apparent that Plaintiff needs more time to complete fact discovery and 
therefore has requested the Court to amend the Scheduling Order to move all disco vei y dates bad by 
s
- -i -• \ - ^ s . 
! he purpose of discovery is to expose the facts and illumi nate the issues. See Hickman v. • 
-
1
 }JML> -^y U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties 
is essential to proper litigation.,") ( Jtali' s disco vei: y i ales are aimed at "facilitating fai r trials with full 
disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence," Roundvv. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999), and are designed so "the court can determi ne the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly 
and expeditiously as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P J A ^K 4I M i Huh 1967). By amending the 
Scheduling <Jrdei hy moving all discovery dates back by three months, the Court will allow the parties 
to gather all relevant facts for the case, and will benefit the court by UV.IIL \: the r.n> -ni:. i 
determine the facts and resolve-the issues. * 
Therefore, hi the interest of exposing the facts and illuminating Lhe issuer, the Cmul should I'raiit 
Mrs. Dahl's request to amend the scheduling order by moving the discovery deadlines back by three 
months. 
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER OUTST AI t DING 
DISCOVERY AND TO SUBMIT TO A DEPOSTION 
Pursuant to Ride 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants moved for an 
order from the Co art to Order Defendants to answer outstanding discovery and to submit to a 
deposition. The outstanding discovery goes to the heart of the issues in Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and they should |»iovid( answers prior to .my consideration of summary 
judgment. 
2 
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Specifically, Plaintiff propounded discovery to Defendants asking them to (1) identify 
any communications that they have had with Mr. Dahl's counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl; (2) 
identify any communications that they have had with Dr. Dahl; (3) identify all cases in which they 
have appeared or consulted that have involved Mr. Dahl's attorney; (4) identify all the cases in 
which they have appeared or consulted in that relate to Dr. Charles Dahl; (5) produce all documents 
relating to any communications between them and Dr. Charles Dahl; (6) produce all documents 
relating to any communications between them and Mr. Dahl's attorney or her agent, which 
related to Mrs. Dahl; (7) produce a list of each case in which they have represented clients against 
parties represented by Mr. Dahl's attorney; (8) produce each document relating to any business 
dealings they have had, they have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl; and (9) produce each 
document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any other relationship, they have had, 
they have, or they plan to have with Dr. Dahl. The response to the outstanding discovery will be 
essential to expose the facts and illuminate the issues with respect to Defendants' Motion, the 
Court should order them to answer the discovery prior to considering the their Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
For the reasons stated in sections I and II above, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a 
Protective Order. Plaintiff has propounded discovery upon Defendants that will serve to expose the 
facts and illuminate the issues of the case. Specifically, Plaintiff has propounded the following 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents upon Defendants: 
3 010407 
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INTERROGATORS NO. 1 :. Identify an y communications that you had with Mrs. Dahl while 
you artod as Lor coim.id Include m your answer the date of the communication,, the place the 
comi , , . . J : : ' ••• di • niesent, and the subject matter of the communicatiorL 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify* m y conununii a boir that you had Willi othei pei sans while 
vi )i I ,„» 1 ed a?; 1 icr legal counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the 
communication, the place the communication look plau:, the people present,, and the sabjcct matter of the 
communication. 
pfTERROGATORY NO. 3 • - ~>.' •• \ w • •l •. * ions that you have had with Rosemond 
Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place 
the communjeatu m look place, the people present,, and the subject matter of the communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you have had with Pi hahl. 
Ineltide m your aiiswei the daleoi the communication, the place the communication took place, the people 
present, and the subject matter of the communication 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted that 
have involved Rosemond Blakelock. . . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or consulted in 
that relate to l)i. (buries Dahl. ' . - " • ' " • 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial ot the allegation thai you 
tillered into the "Stipulation11 without Mr-. Dahl's knowledge or consent. • 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify the basis andthereasc msthdi you reeoiiintein.lui to Mrs. 
I»at 11 u i si gi i up for anger management and parenting classes. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you 
told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not need to 
appear. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to put 
Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted in 
paragraph 40 of your Answer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. Dahl 
violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's counsel.. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are 
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages are a 
result of her own actions. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs.Dahl's damages were 
caused by intervening causes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages were 
the product of circumstances over which you had no control. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are 
barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed to 
mitigate her damages. • ^ ^ 
5 
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'' I N T E R R O G A T O R Y NO. 18: Identify all tim.es in which you have been covered b y malpractice 
insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which you. were covered, and the : name of the iiialpractice 
carrier. • • • • ' . ' • . . 
B E Q U E S T W H I VUi H)l l< Tl< MM O F D O C U M E N T S 
R E Q U E S T N O . 1: Produce all documents relating to youi representation of K im DaU, 
. _ • R E Q U E S T N O . 2 : Produce all documents relating to every agreement , document., or other 
wri t ing that was executed b y the parties, or either of them, to engage t he employment of Br ian C. 
Harrison or ,j-r, -i^niM , • • .< -ml. 
R E Q U E S T N O . 3 : Produce all documents re la t ing to your claim that you had authority I11 
represent M i s Pali1 m r i s e number 064402232. " •. . •' 
R E Q U E S T N O . 4 : Produce all documents relating to yout chum tluif Mrs, 1 )ahl consented tu your 
entry into the "Stipulation" in case number 06440223 2 on. "November 2, 2006. 
R E Q U E S T N O . 5 : Produce all documents relating to yout claim that Mrs. Dahl authorized you to 
your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2 , 2006. 
R E Q U E S T N O . 6: Produce ail documents , notes, memoranda, or o ther writings relating to case 
number 064402232. 
R E Q U E S T NO. 7: Produce all d< uruments relating to any communicat ions be tween you and Dr. 
Charles Dahl , or her claim. 
R E Q U E S T N O , 8: Produce all documents relating to any communicat ions be tween you and 
Rosemond Blakelock, or her agent, which related to "Mrs.. Dahl. 
R E Q U E S T N O . 9 : Produce all documents relating to any conversat ions between you and Mrs. 
Dahl . 
• • • " 6 O f T f e H . 
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REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to Mrs. 
Dahl for your legal counsel and representation. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients against 
parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all the files that relate to your answer to interrogatory number 6 
above. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have had, you 
have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any 
other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory number 10. 
Answers to the above discovery will facilitate a fair trial by the full disclosure of all relevant 
testimony and evidence. Therefore, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Scheduling . 
Order, Motion for Further Discovery, and deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order. 
DATED this / Z. day of May, 2008. -
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
' STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN ^ 
BRENNANH.MOSS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify mat a trae and accurate copy n I PI,A INTIKK'S CONSOLIDATED 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, MOTION 
TO AMEND THE SCHED1IUIN<: ORlH>,U, \N * OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER was sent vi.i •. .>. Mail and e-mail on the I ,»th day of 
May, 200S, to thf t'ollowing' 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com 
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Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KIM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED: 
(1) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER; 
AND 
(2) MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 56(F) MOTION FOR 
FURTHER DISCOVERY AND TO 
AMEND THE SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
Case No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
INTRODUCTION 
In their Motion for Protective Order, Defendants made & prima face demonstration that 
Plaintiffs discovery requests were untimely and that a protective order should be granted. In her 
response, Plaintiff does even attempt to dispute this fact. Instead, Plaintiff makes generic 
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arguments that the discovery will "facilitate a fair trial," and she fails to support any argument 
with anything more than a declaration from her attorney offering the same generic conclusions. 
Specifically, she fails to show any good cause for her untimeliness. Likewise, she fails to offer 
any adequate explanation as to why she failed to pursue any discovery in this case in a timely 
manner. As such, her opposition to Defendants' motion for protective order fails. 
Similarly, Plaintiff has moved to extend the fact discovery cutoff and delay the Court's 
ruling on Defendants' motion for summary judgment with no showing of good cause, or even a 
citation to the good cause standard. This is because Plaintiff cannot show any good cause. She 
conducted no discovery in this case during the Jive months of fact discovery in this matter, a 
period which was proposed by Plaintiff "and stipulated to by Defendants. During that time, 
Plaintiff never noticed or even inquired about taking a single deposition. Other than her untimely 
written discovery, she never even attempted to take any discovery whatsoever. She now moves 
for additional time five weeks after the close of fact discovery and after her responses to 
Defendants' summary judgment motion and motion for protective order were past due. 
Accordingly, having exercised no diligence in pursuing discovery, she cannot now, five weeks 
after the fact discovery cutoff and on the eve of summary judgment, obtain more time. 
Accordingly, her motions to extend discovery and delay resolution of Defendants' summary 
judgment motion should be denied. 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
In opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff does not dispute that 
her discovery requests are untimely, nor does she offer any explanation as to why she waited five 
months to serve any discovery in this matter. Her only argument in opposition to entry of a 
protective order is that additional discovery will facilitate a fair trial. If this sort of conclusory 
argument was adequate, no protective order could ever be entered. Obviously, Plaintiff must 
show more; she must demonstrate that the scheduling order should be amended to allow further 
time for her to conduct discovery, which in turn requires a "particular and specific demonstration 
of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 
U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981). Plaintiff has not, and cannot, make such a showing. See also infra, 
Argument, Part II (addressing Plaintiffs failure to show good cause in more detail). Thus, she 
cannot defeat Defendants' motion for protective order. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO AMEND THE 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND DELAY RESOLUTION OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
A- Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause or Diligence to Warrant 
Further Discovery. 
Modification of a scheduling order may only be obtained by a showing of "good cause5' 
or "manifest injustice." See Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1981) (establishing that 
pre-trial orders may be modified prior to trial for good cause); Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 
238, 241 (Utah 1953) (amendment of pretrial order may be had if it is necessary to avoid 
3 
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"manifest injustice.") (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16). Again, as stated and supported above, "good 
cause" contemplates a "particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from 
stereotyped and conclusory statements." Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102 n.16. Cf also, e.g., In re 
Terra Intern., Inc., 134 F3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying Federal law - "stereotyped and 
conclusory statements" insufficient to show good cause); Welch v. Welch, 828 A.2d 707, 709 
(Conn. Super. Ct 2003) (applying Connecticut law - "Good cause must be based upon a 
particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereo typed and conclusory 
statements."); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 659 (Term. 1996) (applying Tennessee law -
"Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not 
amount to a showing of good cause. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient.") 
Further, in deciding whether to amend the Scheduling Order, the appropriate question to 
ask is not whether Plaintiff desires additional discovery. Instead, the question properly presented 
to the Court is whether Plaintiff has shown that, even with the exercise of diligence, she could 
not have completed this discovery. Deghandv. Wal-Mart Stories, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1218,1221 
(D. Kan. 1995). Indeed, even under Utah R. Civ. P. 6, Plaintiff must show "cause" for such an 
extension. Plaintiff is wholly unable to show good cause for extension of the discovery cutoff. 
Plaintiff merely says that she needs more time to conduct discovery that she should have 
conducted months ago. She claims that she was "overly optimistic" about the schedule in this 
case and that "other matters" have precluded work on this case. These generic arguments are 
precisely the sort that fail to establish "good cause." See id.; Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102 n.16. 
In sum, Plaintiffs purported basis for extension and delay in this case falls far short of 
4
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even the most liberal interpretation of "cause." Accordingly, her motion to amend the 
scheduling order and delay consideration of Defendants' summary judgment motion should be 
denied. 
B. Plaintiff s Motion is Untimely 
Plaintiff filed the instant motions for amendment of the scheduling order and for further 
discovery five weeks after the fact discovery cutoff To the extent Plaintiff perceived that the 
scheduling order was "overly optimistic" or that "other matters" were interfering with discovery 
in this case, she should not have waited until five weeks after the fact discovery cutoff and after 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. She never raised any of these issues until fact 
discovery was complete, Defendants' motion for summary judgment was pending, and her 
responses to the summary judgment motion and the motion for protective order were past due. 
The Court should not permit her to raise these objections now. 
C. Plaintiffs Request Under Rule 56(f) Fails for the Same Reasons 
Rule 56(f) is subject to the same good cause standard: 
[T]he prophylaxis of Rule 56(f) is not available merely for the asking. A litigant 
who seeks to invoke the rule must act with due diligence to show that his 
predicament fits within its confines. To that end, the litigant must submit to the 
trial court an affidavit or other authoritative document showing (i) good cause for 
his inability to have discovered or marshalled [sic] the necessary facts earlier in 
the proceedings; (ii) a plausible basis for believing that additional facts probably 
exist and can be retrieved within a reasonable time; and (iii) an explanation of 
how those facts, if collected, will suffice to defeat the pending summary judgment 
motion. 
We add a further caveat: Rule 56(f) is not designed to give relief to those who 
sleep upon their rights. Consequently, a party seeking to derive the benefit of 
Rule 56(f) must demonstrate due diligence both in conducting discovery before 
5
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the emergence of the summary judgment motion and in pursuing an extension of 
time once the motion has surfaced. 
Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernandez, 502 F.3d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added, internal 
citations omitted); accord Yorkv. Tenn. Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(affirming denial of Rule 56(f) motion); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 
958 F. Supp. 869, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "party seeking additional discovery must 
demonstrate with specificity all of the following: 1) the nature of the uncompleted discovery...; 
and 2) how these facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; and 3) 
what efforts the affiant has made to obtain these facts; and 4) why those efforts were 
unsuccessful"). 
Clearly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause by any stretch of the term. Thus, 
her Rule 56(f) request should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Protective Order should be granted, 
and Defendants motions to amend the scheduling order and for additional discovery should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted this && day of May, 2008. 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
Jg^njeimin W. Lieberman 
-^^Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED: (1) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER; AND (2) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(F) 
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY AND TO AMEND THE SCHEDULING 
ORDER was hand delivered on the 24$aday of May, 2008, to the following: 
Steve S. Christensen 
Brennan H. Moss 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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th*Judic|gj District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C HARRISON PC Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
MOTIONS FOR S.J., ET AL 
Case No: 070403005 MP 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Date: August 7, 2008 
Clerk: joyc 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): BRIAN C HARRISON 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 31 Tape Count: 8:37 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court for various Motions. 
The Court addresses all parties stating a minor relationship when 
the Court was a Prosecutor for the State of Utah. . The Court 
believes there is no conflict and intends to continue handling this 
matter. No objection is stated by Mr. Lieberman. 
Mr. Christensen states he believes there is no conflict, however, • 
would like to advise his client. Court recesses in order for Mr. 
Christensen to contact his client. 
COUNT: 8:49 
Court resumes with all parties present and ready to proceed. 
Mr. Christensen advises he was unable to contact his client. Mr. 
Christensen request a continuance. 
Mr. Lieberman opposes a continuance and requests the hearing move 
forward today. 
Court denies a continuance, however, reserves any concerns at this 
time. 
Mr. Lieberman argues the issue of the Amended Scheduling Order. 
Response by Mr. Christensen followed by Mr. Lieberman. 
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Case No: 
Date: 
070403005 
Aug 07, 2008 
Augment ensues regarding the issues of defendant's Motion for 
Protective Order and Plaintiff's issue regarding Rule 56(f). 
Regarding Rule 56(f), the Court states the plaintiff has failed to 
take care of discovery issues. Plaintiff's Motion is. denied. 
Regarding the issue of defendant's Protective Order, Motion is 
granted. 
Regarding the issue of an Amended Scheduling Order. The Court 
rules for partial amendment. Designation of plaintiff's expert 
witnesses is extended to September 8, 2008. Designation of 
defendant's expert witnesses is extended to October 20, 2008. 
Depositions of all expert witnesses are to be concluded by 
November 7, 2008. Request for a Pretrial Conference on this matter 
should be submitted as soon as discovery is complete. 
Mr. Lieberman to prepare the Amended Scheduling Order. 
Mr. Lieberman addresses the issues regarding Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Strike. Response by Mr. Christensen follows 
strongly requesting an Evidentiary Hearing be held. Mr. Christensen 
requests these Motions be denied by the Court. 
Final argument by Mr. Lieberman. 
The Court was unable to review the audio conducted at previous 
hearings which are germane to findings. Mr. Lieberman does have 
transcripts of these two hearings, and per the Court's request, 
will provide a copy of the November 2, 2006 and 
April 20, 2007 hearings. 
Regarding the issue of Motion to Strike, the Court refers to Rules 
26(a),(e) and 37(f). Court finds the Plaintiff is not permitted to 
use certain exhibits. Motion to Strike in relation to exhibits 5 
and 6 is granted by the Court. 
Motion for Summary Judgment is under advisement. Mr. Lieberman to 
prepare the Order regarding Motion to Strike. 
COUNT: 11:01 
End time. 
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Ben W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C. 
331 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 302 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel: (801) 746-0911 
Fax:(801)746-4398 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIMDAHL; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; 
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah 
professional corporation; 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO 
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
PURSUANT TO 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F) 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C. (collectively "Defendants") 
hereby move the Court for an order striking Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
This motion is based upon the fact that Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports were 
void of any substance and failed to meet the disclosure requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(3)(B), and thus they are automatically stricken pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This motion is supported by the memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith and the 
exhibits attached thereto. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2008, by: 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j]T_ day of September, 2008,1 sent a copy of DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRDXE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F) to the followmg person(s) as indicated below. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Steve Christensen (El U.S. Mail 
BrennanMoss Q Overnight Mail 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC . DFax 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 • Electronic Mail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 • Hand Delivery 
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Ben W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C 
331 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 302 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel: (801) 746-0911 
Fax: (801) 746-4398 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIMDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; 
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah 
professional corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF THEHt MOTION 
TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
PURSUANT TO 
UTAH R.CIV. P. 37(F) 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 7,2008, the Court heard five pending motions; four primarily related to 
discovery matters and one for summary judgment.l The central issue with respect to the 
discovery motions was that Plaintiff, who had conducted no discovery prior to the fact discovery 
1
 The Court ruled from the bench on the discovery motions and took the motion for summary judgment 
under advisement 
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deadline and who missed her deadline to disclose experts, requested further time for discovery. 
At the August 7 Hearing, the Court ruled against Plaintiff in nearly every respect on the 
discovery matters, but it did allow Plaintiff further time to disclose experts. 
Despite being given this extra time by the Court to make expert disclosures, Plaintiff 
failed to make proper expert disclosures when the time came to do so. Indeed, Plaintiffs expert 
disclosures and "reports" listed barely more than the witness's name and failed to state the 
proposed opinion or basis of the opinion. As such, her expert disclosures and "reports" fail to 
meet requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), and they should be stricken pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The initial scheduling order in this matter was set by stipulation in early 
November, 2007. It provided, inter alia, a deadline of May 5,2008, for Plaintiff to disclose any 
experts. 
2. Plaintiffs May 5,2008 expert disclosure deadline came and went, and Plaintiff 
failed to disclose any expert. 
3. On May 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed motions with the Court for amendment of the 
scheduling order and for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
4. On August 7, 2008, the Court held oral argument on all pending motions, 
including PlaintifPs request to amend the scheduling order. The Court denied Plaintiffs request 
for further time for fact discovery, but it did extend the expert discovery deadlines. It gave 
2 
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Plaintiff until September 8,2008, to serve her expert disclosures and reports. 
5. Despite being granted this extension, Plaintiff failed to make proper expert 
disclosures when the time came to do so. The expert disclosures and "reports" that she did serve 
were utterly incomplete, providing the purported experts' names and little more. (See Plaintiff's 
Expert Reports (Exhibit A).) Not a single report by any of the experts is included, nor is any 
specific opinion stated, nor any basis therefor, nor is any curriculum vitae attached. {See id) 
6. For example, Plaintiff purported to disclose two experts, Messrs. Olsen and 
Nielsen, regarding the standard of care owed to a client by a lawyer in private family law 
practice. {See id.) Yet, Plaintiff never identifies what that opinion is or the grounds for that 
opinion. (See id.) Nor does Plaintiff state anything about the qualifications of either witness 
other than the number of years each has been in practice. {See id.) Likewise, Plaintiff purports 
to offer their testimony for the conclusions that "Plaintiff was damaged, the causation of the 
damages, and the extent of the damages," yet she never states the basis of those vague and 
conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all 
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id.) 
7. Plaintiff also purports to disclose a damages expert, John Brough. (See id.) 
Again, Plaintiff merely states that Mr. Brough will testify as to the amount of damages, but she 
never identifies any specific amount or computation, nor any specific basis for the undisclosed 
opinion. (See id.) Moreover, disclosure of Mr. Brough's qualifications merely states that he is 
"an economic and valuation expert" and has testified as an expert before, without identifying 
when and where as required by Rule 26. (See id) Plaintiff never states the basis of the vague 
3 
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and conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all 
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id.) 
8. Lastly, Plaintiff purports to disclose three doctors as experts who will testify 
about "causation of physical injuries suffered by the Plaintiff." (See id.) Nothing therein 
identifies any opinion, any specific basis, or any relevant qualifications of any witness beyond 
their status as a doctor. (See id.) And again, Plaintiff never states the basis of the vague and 
conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all 
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id) 
9. On September 10,2008, counsel for Defendants notified Plaintiff of the 
shortcomings of her disclosures and invited her to serve complete reports. (See September 10, 
2008 Letter from Ben W. Lieberman to Brennan H. Moss (Exhibit B).) Plaintiff failed to do so 
within the proposed timeframe. Indeed, she did not respond at all 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES ARE GROSSLY DEFICIENT. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) governs the disclosure of expert testimony in civil cases. With 
respect to experts retained specifically for a given matter, which is the case here, Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(3)(B) requires a written report also be disclosed, and it outlines what that report must 
contain: 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to 
testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to 
testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the 
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the 
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and 
4 
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a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial 
or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
Utah R. Civ P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
The purpose of an expert report is to allow the opposing party sufficient information 
about the expert's opinion such that the opposing party may adequately prepare for trial. 
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002). The Advisory Notes to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26 indicate that the purpose of the expert report is to "serve in lieu of responses to 
standard interrogatories." Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes. The Rule 26 Advisory Notes go 
on to state: 
The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report, 
regardlless whether the expert or the party prepares or signs it. For this reason, the 
committee believes the expert should prepare and sign the report whenever 
possible and should always review and approve the report. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In Jacobsen, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed similarly inconclusive and 
incomplete expert reports to those at issue here, and it reversed the district court's refusal to 
strike them, stating in part: 
"[Expert] reports are intended not only to identify the expert witness, but also to 
set forth the substance of the direct examination. Such disclosure is necessary to 
allow the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross 
examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses." 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Jacobsen court went on to state that, 
"[i]f the experts are allowed to testify on the basis of their incomplete reports, [the plaintiff] will 
be prejudiced. Absent more complete disclosure by the experts, [the plaintiffs] prejudice cannot 
be cured." Id at 954. See also Bowie Mem'l Hosp v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) 
5 
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("[T]he expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts "). 
Here, Plaintiffs expert "reports" are so deficient that they realistically amount to no 
disclosure at all She has merely given names and extremely vague and generalized topics upon 
which the expert may opine. (See Statement of Facts fl 6-8.) She cites nothing that any expert 
actually has reviewed to form the basis of his or her opinion; instead, Plaintiff merely states that 
the expert's opinion "will be based" on essentially everything in the ease. (See id.) As a 
corollary, the "reports" fail to state any link between fact and conclusion, likely because no 
expert has actually reviewed any fact.' Cf Bo me Mem'l Hosp., 79 S.W- 3d at 52 (expert must 
identify link between fact and conclusion in report). Plaintiff also fails to state qualifications of 
an> of the experts with any meaningful specificity (See id.) This is far from stating a response 
to the standard expert interrogatories that Rule 26(a)(3)(b) is intended to replace. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes. , ' ' •" 
Plaintiffs deficient expert reports cause, prejudice to Defendants in a number ways. First, 
Defendants cannot prepare for the trial testimony and cross-examination of these experts based 
on the "reports" provided. ISecond, Defendants will not be able lo impeach any of these 
"experts" at trial with the "reports" because they are so vague and conclusory. Third, the Court 
will not he ;ihk In itidpe whether an) of these individuals testifies inconsistently with the 
"reports" because they are so vague and conclusory and void of substance. Cf I Itah R, Ci\ P 
26, Advisory Notes ("The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report 
..."). Fourth, not knowing any actual opinions or the bases therefor, Defendants cannot 
determine whether one or more experts of their own are necessary to rebut these vague, 
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conclusory, and hypothetical opinions. Fifth, Defendants will be required to depose each of the 
experts to learn anything about his or her testimony, leading to significant wasted time and 
expense. Sixth, the strong implication of the "reports" is that the "experts" have conducted no 
review at this time, but instead that their opinions "will be based" on review of discovery 
materials and the like. 
In sum, there is nothing in Plaintiffs expert "reports" that is even remotely informative 
of opinions of an "expert," bases of any opinion, or qualifications of an "expert" to render any 
such opinion.. Plaintiff is required to disclose a presently-held opinion of an expert with 
sufficient detail to substitute for responding to standard interrogatories, not one is vague, void of 
substance, nor one that is hypothetical in that it may arise after a future review of relevant 
materials. 
DL PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS FALL UNDER 
RULE 37(F)'S AUTOMATIC EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION. 
Where a party fails to make a proper expert disclosure, that party is precluded from using 
the evidence at trial: 
Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response 
to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use 
the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In 
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action 
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs expert disclosures fail Rule 
26(a)(3)(B), they are subject to Rule 37(f)'s automatic exclusionary provision. Moreover, 
having already given Plaintiff one extension of the expert discovery deadline, and Defendants 
7 
"U'3586 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
having given her notice and an opportunity to cure the deficient repor ts, ( ^ . M • «, the Court 
should not allow Plaintiff any further time to make any further disclosure. } <. the extent this case 
sin: vives summary judgment, Defendants are prepared to proceed to trial forthwith. Any such 
trial should occur without Plaintiffs proposed expert testimony due to her failure to comply with 
E; i lie 26(a)(3)(B).' ' . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to strike should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2008, "by: 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j5_ day of September, 2008,1 sent a copy of 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO 
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS PURSUANT 
TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F) to the following person(s) as indicated below. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Steve Christensen 
Brennan Moss 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IH U.S. Mail 
O Overnight Mail 
• Fax 
|~l Electronic Mail 
[~1 Hand Delivery 
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drr. D1STWCTC0URT 
Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
BrennanH. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KIM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTJFF'S 
EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
: ss 
) 
Affiant, STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, having been duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney for Kim Dahl in the above referenced matter, 
2. I can testify to the facts in this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
3. Based on information and belief, the facts set forth in Defendants' Motion to Strike are 
not in dispute and do not relate to substantive issues in this litigation. 
»v.& 0598 
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4. On Monday, September 15, 2008, three (3) business days after a request to supplement 
our expert report was sent to us, I corresponded with Ben Lieberman, counsel for Mr. Harrison. I 
indicated to Mr. Lieberman that we were willing to supplement our expert report as he had requested. 
5. Mr. Lieberman indicated that it was too late; his Motion to Strike had already been filed. 
He was not willing to agree to the extension of time requested. A true and correct copy of my 
correspondence .with Mr. Lieberman including my email to him and his response is attached to this 
affidavit as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
6. ' Based on Mr. Lieberman's request, we are in the process of obtaining updated expert 
witness reports. 
day of October 2008. DATED this / 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / ^ d a y of October 2008. 
Notary Public J 
RACHEL H. BEALL « 
136 E. South Temple, Suite 850 ' 
Sait Lake City, UT 84111 J 
<*Vly Commission Expires
 e 
" November 27, 2010 u 
State of Utah c 
otary Public Commissioned in the State of UT 
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C E R T 1 F I C A T E O F S E R V I C E 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE S. 
CHRISTENSEN IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS was sent via email, and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 1st day of 
October, 2008, to the following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN 
331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 302 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
TiL^L^'[^yiM^ri\ 
Ah employee of HiRSCHl CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
F:\eHRS-CU\ACTIVE F1LESVDOMESTIC RELAT10NS\DlYORCE\DAHL\LEGAl MALPRACT1CEVPLEADINGS\Opp.Mol.Slrikc.Expcrts - AfT.SSC.doc 
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Steve Christensen 
From: Ben Lieberman [ben@bwiiaw.com] 
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2008 4:09 PM 
To: 'Steve S. Christensen* 
St ibject: RE: Dahl v, Harrison 
Steve, 
The motion has already been put in the mail to the Court. In the letter, I made sure to 
underline the deadline and give you two and a half days to respond. No one responded to me 
on this issue, though Brennan responded to me on other matters regarding this case. To be 
frank, the reports were the farthest thing I have ever seen from what the Rules require. 
Though I am generally first in line to grant extensions out of courtesy, I have already spent 
my client's money to file this motion, and given that Plaintiff has already been granted a fot ir 
month extension of this deadline over our objection, I cannot agree to your proposal. 
Ben • 
From: Steve S. Christensen [mailto:SSC@HCLawFirm.net] 
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2008 3:15 PM 
To: ben@bwliaw.com 
Subject: Dahl v. Harrison 
Ben, • 
I am receipt of your.letter requesting further information regarding our expert witness designation. We are gathering 
additional information in order to satisfy your request. 1 see that you gave us until last Friday to respond. It will take us 
another 11 days to comply with your request. Please allow us this additional amount of time. 
Because of the shortness of time set by the court's scheduling order, we propose that the parties stipulate to extend the 
discovery dates by 3 weeks following our designation in order to allow you sufficient time to conduct your review and 
depositions. 
Steve S. Christensen . 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel. (801) 303-5800 
Fax (801) 322-0594 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This electronic message transmission contains information from the law firm of Hirschi Cliristensen, 
PLLC, which may be confidential or privileged. The information is intended to be for the vise of the individual or entity named 
above. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this 
information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify me by telephone (801-303-5800) or 
by electronic mail fsscCgihclawfinn.net) immediately. 
IRS CIRCULAR 230 DISCLOSURE: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that, unless 
specifically indicated otherwise, any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not 
intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) 
promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein. 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Kim Dahl 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 
KIM DAHL, 
. • . I OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
Plaintiff, ' • MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S 
I EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
vs. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, and hereby 
submits her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports, 
as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Trial has not been set in this matter. See Case Docket. 
2. A pretrial has not been requested or scheduled in this matter. 
2008 OCT - 2 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
A " ' •'•" 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 . 1 ^ ^ • l - . . i l . i l l l . i - ! . :^! MM , : i jv f ! ' J I H ^ V ' ^ ' . ' . ' l i : J J - ^ i •• S t»p1:*r.I • - *08 . 
4. Plaintiff produced her expert witness report on or about September 8, 2008. See 
Exhibit. A to the Motion to Strike. 
5. On or about September 10,2008, counsel for Defendants sent a letter to counsel 
for Plaintiff by email stating that he felt the expert reports were deficient under U.R.C.P. 
26(a)(3)(B), and Requesting supplementation ol (he report11 by l"nda>, Sepleinbei 12, 200S "wo 
(2) days later. See Exhibit B to the Motion to Strike. 
( On Monday, September 15, 2008, three (3) business days after the letter from 
counsel for Defendants was sent, Mr. Christensen, counsel for Plaintiff, corresponded with 
counsel for Defendants regarding supplementation of the expert reports. See the Affidavit of 
Steve S. Christensen in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Disclosures and 
Reports (the "Christensen Affidavit"), 14. Mr. Christensen agreed to supplement the expert 
reports as requested. Id. 
Counsel for Defendants indicated that it was too late and that he had already filed 
the instant motion I i at'f 5 Coi insel for Defendants further indicated that he would not grant 
Plaintiff any time to supplement the expert reports even though Plaintiff proposed a stipulation to 
extend expert discovery in order to give Defendants more time to conduct expert discovery. Id. 
Ill 
III 
III 
III 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's Motion is Premature As Defendants Failed To Attempt To 
Resolve This Matter In Good Faith 
As noted by Defendants, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
the disclosure of expert witness reports, and states: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide 
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly 
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and 
signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to 
• which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be 
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding 
four years. 
U.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
The Defendants' Motion to Strike purports to be based on U.R.C.P. 37(f). However, the 
remedy sought by the pleading derives from U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(C). Rule 37(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall not admit witnesses, documents, or other 
materials which have not been disclosed in accordance with Rule 26(a). The Rule also permits 
the court to impose additional sanctions "upon motion" and as "authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2)," which sanctions include striking of pleadings, dismissal of actions, entry of default, 
finding of contempt, and payment of attorneys fees. U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2). Rule 37(f) is primarily 
drafted to describe the court's ability to limit evidence. However, no evidence is being offered at 
3 
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this time. R ule 37(f) also allows for amotion for sanctions through Rule 37(b)(2) However, 
Rule 37(b)(2) disclosure sanctions are appropriately reserved for when a party has not complied 
with a court order compelling disclosure obtained through Rule 37(a). See id. The court should 
require Defendant to comply with Rule 37(b) to the extent that Defendants are seeking to claim 
37(b)(2) sanctions through Rule 37(f). 
In turn R I lie 3 7(b)(2) incorporates R ule 37(a)(2) which requires that a moving par I:> 
certify good faith attempts to resolve the dispute prior to seeking court involvement. Because 
plaintiff has foiled to demonstrate that he "has made a good faith c ffort to seci ire fi uther 
disclosure without court action in accordance with U.RC.P. Rule 37(a)(2)(A), he should not be 
able to seek sanctions by motion.. Thus, Defendants' motion to strike is both premature and 
inappropriate. 
This approach to the discovery rules would be consistent with the court's policy to 
encourage good faith cooperation between the parties uiirh..; -ir<- * • o •* u:; ^ vi,; n 2 M \.) 
mandates that a movant seeking an order to compel discovery "include a certification that the 
iiio v ant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the pai tj in an effort tc secure 
the disclosure without court action." 
Defendants have not acted in good faith in attempting to resolve this issue without 
resorting to judicial intervention. Indeed, Defendants made only a token effort to address their 
concern before filing the instant motion. It is undisputed that Defendants gave Plaintiff only two 
business days to respond to the request for supplementation. See i• \i • • • • • - K. iiristensen 
Affidavit. When contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, counsel for Defendants indicated that the 
4 
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instant motion had already been mailed for filing, suggesting that he had prepared the motion 
without even waiting to see if Plaintiff would respond. Moreover, when Plaintiff agreed to 
comply with the request for supplementation, counsel for Defendants would not agree and chose 
instead to continue pursuing their motion. 
2. The Motion To Strike Fails Due To Plaintiffs Compliance, A Lack Of Fault And A 
Lack Of Prejudice 
Defendants5 Motion to Strike fails for several reasons. First, Plaintiff's expert 
disclosures substantially complied with the Rules. Second, Defendants have not reasonably 
attempted to resolve this matter prior to filing their Motion to Strike. Third, Defendants have 
suffered absolutely no prejudice as a result of Plaintiff s expert disclosures and reports, and will 
not suffer any prejudice if the Court grants Plaintiff more time to revise said reports. For the 
foregoing reasons, which are set forth more fully below, the Court should deny Defendants' 
Motion to Strike, or in the alternative, provide Plaintiff with additional time to revise her expert 
reports. 
a. Plaintiffs Expert Reports Substantially Complied With Rule 26(a)(3)(B) 
As noted above, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) requires an expert reports to disclose (i) the subject 
matter of the on which the expert is expected to testify; (ii) the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; 9iii) a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; (iv) the qualifications of the witness; (v) the compensation to be paid; and (vi) a listing 
of other cases in which the witness has testified. U.R.CJP. 26(a)(3)(B). 
5 
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Plaintiff sexpert ^ .n • , '.v>"i: .iinsujr'i.tJ • . «-n pu,{ I •: ti •/ forgoing •• 
elements. Se£ Exhibit A to the Motion to Strike. Indeed, the expert reports specifically address 
each of the foregoing categories. Despite Defendants' argument that the reports are "grossly 
deficient," at worst the reports provide sufficient information to allow Defendant to determine 
the purpose of the experts, whether a deposition will be required, whether rebuttal experts will be 
required, etc. 
Moreover, Plaintiff readily agreed to supplement the reports but was not given time from 
the Defendants to do so See the Christensen Affidavit, 'ffl I -6 
b Plaintiff Has Not Acted With Willfulness, Bad Faith Or Fault 
In addition, the case law of this jurisdiction requires that before issuing discovery' 
sanctions the Court first find that Plaintiff has acted in willful disobedience to an order, acted in 
bad faith or fault, or otherwise demonstrated persistent dilatory tactics in the litigation. 
Coray, 112 P.3d at 1246. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining discovery sanctions. Hales v. Oldroyd, 
999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000). However, "[b]efbre the court imposes discovery sanctions 
under rule 37, it must find on the part of the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or fault, 
or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the ji idicial process,," Coxeyi Ff external Order oj the 
Eagles, Aerie 2742, 112 P.3d 1244,1246 (Utah 2005); citing Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 
938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997), W. W. & W.B. Gardner, 568 P.2d at 738; see also Hales v. ' 
Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000); Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 
1997). 
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There is no evidence of bad faith, willfulness, fault or persistent dilatory tactics before 
the Court. Defendants have not even made allegations as to fault. Accordingly, the Motion to 
Strike should be denied. 
c. Defendants Are Not Prejudiced By Allowing Plaintiff To Supplement 
Rule 37(f) governs discovery sanctions related to the failure to disclose and states: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by 
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required 
by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or 
other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2). 
U.R.C.P. 37(f). Rule 37(f) specifically states that failure to disclose is grounds for striking a 
witness "unless the failure to disclose is harmless ..." U.RC.P. 37(f). Here, the failure to 
disclose is harmless and does not prejudice Defendants in any way. 
Notably, there was a disclosure and expert reports were provided. As noted above, the 
reports were arguably and demonstrably substantially compliant with Rule 26(a)(3)(B), Even if 
they were not sufficient, Defendants have not suffered any harm as a result, and Plaintiff should 
be granted the opportunity to supplement. 
Indeed, in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the decision of a trial court to allow an expert witness to testify at trial that was not 
disclosed until five days before trial, and no expert report was provided until the day before trial. 
The Christenseon Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony because 
"the expert was made available to the [opposing party] either for an informal interview or for a 
7 <H;060X 
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deposition" and there was therefore no prejudice resulting from the i intimely expert disclosures. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1377- 78, 
Importantly, no trial has been set in instant case. Nor has the deadline for discovery of 
expert witnesses concluded. Accordingly, Defendants are not prejudiced iii the slightest by 
Plaintiff s expert disclosures. This is especially true given that Plaintiff has agreed to 
supplement to disclosures Accordingly, the Motion to Strike should be denied. • 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintii' *^r • n- »* -i\i *^n- *"'..*• • 
deny the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports. In the alternative, if the 
Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike, Plaintiff hereby requests that she be granted 
sufficient time to revise her expert reports. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2008. 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PI ,1 ,C 
'Steve A. Christensen 
Jeffrey J. Steele 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify tliat a true and correct copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS was sent 
via email, and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of October, 2008, to the following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN 
331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 302 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
^JLM^TK 
F:\CHRS-CLI\ACTIVE FlLESVDOMESTIC RELATK>NS\DlVQRCRDAHULEGAL MALPRACTlCEy>LEAD!NGS\Opp.Mol.Slrikc.Experts.doc 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEC 16 2008 
4TH DISTRICT 
WBrffiHPr. 
KIM DAHI i 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s 
BRIAN C HARRISON PC Et al, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Case Nc ): 07040 300 5 MP 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Date: December 16, 2008 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
raelenec 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-201 49 Tape Count: 10.25 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-201 49 COUNT: 10.25 
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Arguments. The Court 
and both parties discuss the filings of opposition and reply. Mr 
Lieberman states Mr. Christensen stated via e-mail that he was 
ready to move forward with the Motion to Compel, 
The Court takes a brief recess for Mr. Lieberman to pu:.. ;;, his 
e-mail and print out the e-mail between both parties. 
COUNT: 10.34 
Court resumes. The Court reviews the e-mail and states the 
parties will move forward with the arguments of Motion to Strike 
and Motion to Compel. . 
Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding Motion to Strike, 
untimely filing of documents, Rule 26(a) (3) (b) and disclosure 
rules. Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding Motion to 
Strike, designation of expert witnesses, requests filing of 
reports of expert witnesses be extended until January 2009. Mr. 
Lieberman responds. The Court reviews the file and the case 
management order. 
The Court makes findings and grants the Motion to Strike-4s to the 
a 
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Case No: 070403005 
Date: Dec 16, 2008 
request for attorney!s fees the Court denies the request. Mr. 
Lieberman is to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order in this matter. 
Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding Motion to Compel, 
attempt to remove protective order issue and opposition memorandum. 
The Court takes a brief recess. 
COUNT: 11.43 
Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding protective order in 
case #064402232, copies of documents, motion is defective and 
request to deny motion. Mr. Lieberman responds. 
The Court makes findings and denies the Motion to Compel. Mr. 
Lieberman is allowed to make an appointment to go over and inspect 
Mr. Christensen1s file numbers 070403005 and 064402232. 
Mr. Christensen is to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order in this matter. 
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MISSING DOCUMENT 
Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses 
at Trial 
Filed January 21,2009 
- "mi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4TH DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, 
KIM DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C HARRISON.PC Et-al, 
Defendant. 
Clerk: raelenec 
PRESENT 
Defendant (s) : BRIAN C HARRISON 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN 
Audio 
Tape Number: 09-201 15 Tape Count: 1.36 
HEARING 
TAPE: 09-201 15 COUNT: 1.36 
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Argument. Mr. 
Christensen addresses the Court regarding motion for trial by jury 
and prejudice issue. Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding 
motion for trial by jury. Mr. Christensen responds. 
The Court makes findings and adopts the argument of Mr. Lieberman 
and denies the motion for trial by jury. Mr. Lieberman is to 
prepare the findings of fact and order in this matter. 
COUNT: 2.28 
Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding motion to allow 
testimony of expert witness at trial. Mr. Lieberman addresses the 
Court regarding motion to allow testimony of expert witness at 
trial. Mr. Christensen responds. 
The Court makes findings and adopts the argument of Mr. Lieberman 
and denies the motion to allow testimony of expert witness at 
trial. The defendant is granted attorney fees and costs as to this 
matter. 
Mr. Lieberman is to prepare the findings of fact and order in this 
matter. Both parties are to file a list of witnesses and a brief 
paragraph regarding what the witness will testify about by 
03/31/09. 
Pretrial Conference is scheduled. 
COURT - PROVO , 
STATE OF UTAH hrit"- * * L^ 
MINUTES i^Mi'fcOF'UTi 
ORAL ARGUMENT UTAH COUNTS 
Case No: 070403005 MP 
Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Date: March 12. 2009 
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Case No: 
D a t e : 
070403005 
Mar 12 , 2009 
P R E T R I A I J CONFERENCE i s s c h e d u l e d . 
D a t e : 0 4 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 9 
Time: 09 :00 a .m. 
L o c a t i o n : Second F l o o r , Rm 2 01 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
B e f o r e J u d g e : CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
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Proposed by: 
Ben W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, PLC 
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 505-0585 
Toil-Free Telephone (877) 460-6661 
Toll-Free Fax: (800) 886-3653 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIMDAHL; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; 
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALLOW EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL AND 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at 
Trial and on Defendants' related Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. For the reasons set forth 
below and those stated at the March 12, 2009 hearing on these motions, the Court denies 
Plaintiffs motion and grants Defendants' motion for their attorneys' fees and costs. 
APR 1 4 2009 
STATEOFUTAB/ 
UTAHCOIMTY 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The initial scheduling order in this matter was set by stipulation in early 
November, 2007. It provided, inter alia, a deadline of May 5,2008, for Plaintiff Kim Dahl 
("Plaintiff") to disclose any experts. 
2. Plaintiffs May 5, 2008 expert disclosure deadline came and went, and Plaintiff 
failed to disclose any expert. 
3. On May 12,2008, Plaintiff filed motions with the Court for amendment of the 
scheduling order and for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Utah 
R, Civ. P. 56(f). 
4. . On August 7,2008, the Court held oral argument on all pending motions, 
including Plaintiff's request to amend the scheduling order. The Court denied Plaintiffs request 
for further time for fact discovery, but it did extend the expert discovery deadlines. It gave 
Plaintiff until September 8,2008, to serve her expert disclosures and reports. 
5. Despite being granted this extension, Plaintiff failed to make proper expert 
disclosures when the time came to do so. The expert disclosures and reports that she did serve 
were failed utterly by any standards, providing the purported experts' names and little more. 
6. On September 18, 2008, Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, 
P.C. (collectively, "Defendants") moved to strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (the "Motion to Strike"). Plaintiff filed her opposition 
memorandum to the Motion to Strike on October 2,2008. Defendants filed their reply 
memorandum on October 14,2008. 
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7. On December 16, 2008, the Court held oral argument on the Motion to Strike. 
The Court granted the motion and found a willful failure on the part of Plaintiff to carry this case 
forward and to obey the orders of the Court. 
8. At the December 16,2008 hearing, Plaintiff requested more time to prepare 
proper disclosures and reports, which the Court specifically rejected at that time. 
9. The Court ordered Ben W. Lieberman, counsel for Defendants, to prepare a 
written order memorializing the Court's order from the bench. Mr. Lieberman did so, and sent 
the order to Mr. Christensen. Plaintiff objected to the proposed order, but only as to the 
preliminary language regarding how long of an extension Plaintiff had been given by the Court 
on August 7,2008. Plaintiff did not object to the proposed order's language indicating that the. 
motion to strike was granted and the expert disclosures stricken. 
10. Less than six weeks after her expert disclosures were stricken by the Court, 
Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which raises issues materially identical to those already decided 
in the context of the Motion to Strike. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is in 
essence a motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior order striking Plaintiff's expert 
disclosures. . . . 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial cites no basis that would 
warrant reconsideration of the prior order on the Motion to Strike. 
3 
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3. The Court finds no basis to grant Plaintiff more time to disclose experts, and thus 
declines to do so. 
4. The Court finds no basis to allow Plaintiff to introduce expert testimony at trial, . 
given the fact that Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) clearly and unequivocally requires proper disclosure as a 
condition precedent to admission of evidence. 
5. Because these issues had already been specifically decided six weeks prior, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff s Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is frivolous. 
6. In such cases, the Court has statutory power under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 
to award reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
7. Additionally, Court has the inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney 
fees and costs when it deems appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. 
8. Utilizing these statutory and equitable powers, the Court grants Defendants their 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs Motion to Allow 
Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for recovery of such fees and costs. 
ORDER OF COURT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated on the record at the March 12,2009 
hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff s Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is 
DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED. . 
. It is further ORDERED that, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs . 
counsel shall pay to Defendants the sum of $ Q.
 t H S^. L CL ^ , which the Court finds is _ 
—
l —
^ — ^ 101054 
the amount of Defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs iipirred in defending against 
UUAl,^^^^ ~ 
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Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for 
recovery of such fees and costs 
fK 
SO ORDERED this jv day of _ ,2009, by: 
(JU^uJ^u^ 
The Honorable Clai 
Fourth District Co 
rs&fKL if- JA/ r> 
&\*%?^£^+ 
,7 .'*' -* -_ <ris*$Vfl 
f _—,<* ^f*j.-V - -T!~ / V^J . 
A3 XZjrmJwtf' ^- vw 
Agreed as to form: 
mfi^^msi 
^Zf-^^M Sfw-^Sj^' 
Steve Christensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
^r 
I hereby certify that on the 3__ day of March, 2009,1 sent a copy of the foregoing to 
the following person(s) as indicated below. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Steve S. Christensen 
Matthew B. Anderson 
Steven A, Clayton 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
[X] U.S. Mail 
Q Overnight Mail 
• Fax 
Q Electronic Mail 
n Hand Delivery 
^ 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: It doesn't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. That helps because I didn't 
hink that was anything that was framed by your motion and 
our memorandum. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Maybe that's a question the Court 
wants to decide later but — 
THE COURT: Well, if it's not before me now - right? 
JLet's stick with what's before me today. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We'll raise that late. On the 
issues regarding — 
THE COURT: And that takes us right back to Pete 
§is. Youngblood I believe, but a different issue. But I don't 
§V.'-
fihink that's before me today. I think as I look at your 
Snemorandum, your first point and your first argument is this 
^ V - v 
i--c 
|Bourt should grant an extension of time to file expert 
itness disclosures because no prejudice will result. That's 
fjrour first argument and after that it's your conclusions. So 
!p;think that's where we're going. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm prepared to discuss that, 
5four Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, let's discuss that. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, up until this point 
^obviously the Court has heard a motion to exclude an expert 
fi-jwitness report and the Court granted that motion. Our 
^.•request is that the Court now allow us sufficient time to 
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designate experts and to have them available to counsel to 
depose, to have additional time to prepare an expert witness 
report if the Court so requires or to allow them to testify 
based on making them available for their depositions. I 
don't know that the Court has made a ruling about witnesses, 
expert witnesses not being helpful in this case and so we ask 
the Court to determine that expert witness testimony would be 
helpful to the Court in resolving this matter since the Court 
will be making the decision and make adequate accommodations 
so that the parties can have those witnesses available and 
give the Court that additional benefit at trial. Again, we 
have time, trial has not been set, there's no reason why the 
parties cannot conduct expert discovery and expert 
disclosures sufficient to have both parties prepared and 
ready to go at the time of trial, I don't think it's 
uncommon to have expert discovery done in the last month 
before, trial and so because we believe that it is doable, 
feasible and we believe it would be helpful to the Court, we 
ask the Court to make allowance and to also allow those 
witnesses to testify at trial. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. LIEBERMAN: I don't know that I can distinguish 
very well between this motion and our motion for attorney' s 
fees because I think this is abuse. I think this is abuse of 
the process. These are precisely the issues that were before 
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THE COURT: No, we're fine. 
Mr. Christensen. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, this could not be a 
request for reconsideration because it's our first motion. 
THE COURT: Well, it's essentially a reiteration of 
your arguments against their Motion to Strike. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And we're not trying to hide that 
from the Court. The arguments are parallel but not — 
THE COURT: Not parallel, Mr. Christensen, they're 
identical, Mr. Christensen. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay, I'm not trying to hide that 
from the Court — 
THE COURT: We've been here and done this. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand that. Your Honor. 
It's identical but the request of relief is not identical. 
The motion brought by Mr. Harrison, by Mr. Lieberman on Mr. 
Harrison's behalf was extremely narrow. All they asked the 
Court to do was to strike the expert reports. 
THE COURT: Which as a natural result, disallows 
their testimony. You can't put them on if they haven't had 
notice. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I don't know. The Court did 
not make that statement at the hearing. The Court has not 
ruled on that issue. 
THE COURT: I didn't need to. 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: Say that again. 
THE COURT: I didn't need to. If you don't provide 
them with the reports the rule doesn't allow it to go 
anywhere from there. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I think that the 
request to allow testimony is a different request than the 
request to strike their reports. If the Court believes that 
one leads to the other, then I understand your ruling. But I 
still the question is worth asking, I think it's worth 
answering for the Court so that we know whether we can put 
expert witnesses on the stand at trial because that question 
has not been asked and it has not been answered by the Court 
up to this point. 
THE COURT: Well, I think, if I recall you got a 
pretty strong reaction.from me when you told me that you were 
going to file this motion. I think I was pr.etty surprised. 
All right. Anything else? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No. I mean, I think it's 
procedurally proper and necessary. The arguments are not 
different from the arguments we made before but the relief 
requested is different and we ask the Court to instruct us as 
to whether the Court will allow expert witnesses who are 
hired for the purpose of litigation to testify at trial under 
any circumstances, whether it be by deposition, by submitting 
reports or for just in the interest of justice. That's 
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Anything else, Mr. Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN; May I? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: .Your.Honor, on the one hand I 
understand what the Court is thinking in terms of if I've 
stricken expert reports, then something has to happen before 
testimony can be given at trial but that's what this request 
is all about. I mean, there is no rule that says once I 
grant a motion to grant expert reports, ipso facto, there's 
not going to be any expert testimony at trial and our request 
today is asking the Court under it's equitable jurisdiction 
to allow expert testimony at trial. That request has not 
been made, I think it's appropriate for that request to be 
made. I think it's appropriate for the Court to allow that 
testimony. This Court has equitable jurisdiction and whether 
a witness testifies at trial is in the sound discretion of 
the Court but I don't think that we can just assume that the 
Court has ruled on that when the Court hasn't and there's no 
rule that answers that question. It's not a mathematical 
equation. It's a question of how this Court wants to conduct 
trial and manage its calendar and decide who testifies at 
trial and had Mr. Lieberman put in his motion we asked the 
Court to strike all expert testimony at trial, and the Court 
did, then that would have solved the problem. But we're 
asking the Court now to allow that testimony and answer that 
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question. 
That's all I have. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I think this is a Motion for Reconsideration which 
motions are frowned upon by the Supreme Court. I think it 
Justice Nehring that said that the proliferation of these 
motions was like the proliferation of cheat grass or 
something like that. Although this is not a second motion 
for the plaintiff, it is the second go round on the very same 
issue. His responses to the defendant's motion to strike his 
expert witness reports are the same as his responses here. 
As I look at Rule 37F, it says, "Failure to 
disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document 
or other material as required by Rule 26A" which is exactly 
what I found at our previous hearing, "or to amend the prior 
response" which doesn't apply here, "that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document, or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose." I found 
neither of those. I did not find that the failure to 
disclose was harmless and I did not find that the plaintiff 
showed good cause for the failure to disclose. 
The only wiggle room that's allowed under this rule 
is the next sentence, "In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the Court may order any other sanction including 
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Your Honor, I do believe that we have a duty to 
supplement. I do believe he's entitled to that information 
and I represent to this Court that we're going to do that 
diligently, that we have continued to do it even though he 
would not agree with us to do it. 
THE COURT: Well, it's now December, it's now mid-
December. What have you got for him this far? Apparently 
one. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Got one but I'm trying to - I've 
talked at length with the other two experts that need to 
submit supplements. If I could have until the first Monday 
in January I will have supplements for the other two experts 
to him and so I request the Court to allow us to do that. 
THE COURT: .All right. Anything else? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't believe that a sanction 
is available because there's been no allegation of bad faith 
and that's required under 37F as well. 
•And finally, even though I think Christensen/Jewkes 
is a case, an extreme, we're not arguing that the Court 
should wait until five days before trial and let us 
supplement all that time. It stands for the proposition that 
if there is time for them to get the information in order to 
prepare for trial, then there's not prejudice and if we can 
have until the first Monday in January, there's no way they 
could be prejudiced because they will have time to get the 
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plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses other than 
perhaps what they're going to charge per hour and what their 
area of opinion might be if and when it is obtained. I find 
that Mr. Lieberman certainly had a reason to object to this 
expert witness report. 
Now, let's deal with the issue of whether or not he 
appropriately dealt with the requirements of 37, Rule 37 in 
filing his motion. 37A(2)(a), "If a party fails to make a 
disclosure required by Rules 26A, any other party may move to 
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion 
must include a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not 
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure 
without court action." 
Normally I would expect a certification with the 
either part of an affidavit or at the very least, part of a 
motion attached with, some sort of either an affidavit or in 
this case a letter. What I have in this case is a letter 
that was mailed via electronic mail it says on September 10, 
2008 and there's apparently no argument with that. And in 
that Mr. Lieberman addresses the various issues. Quotes Rule 
26A(3)(b); notes that the plaintiff never identifies what the 
opinion of the experts is with regard to Messrs. Olsen and 
Nielsen. He lists the problems, explains the problems. This 
is a one and a half page letter. It talks about Mr. Brough 
:
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•%tie we get done, we're going to back right where we were a 
e^ar previous. 
In all honesty, I thought I was overly kind in 
itmg the motion when we met in July. This is a case that 
now been going for well over a year - well, I can't tell 
when the complaint was filed because I've only got the 
cond file and I did notice that in the printout of the 
:ket that was included on the other motion that the relate 
a*ke is moving along. There are things being filed 
Wtedly. Maybe not repeatedly, not that they're being 
eated in their filings but all kinds of matters are bein< 
£led, all kinds of hearings are being held at the same tim 
"at nothing is happening on the discovery for the plaintiffs 
~this case as to their experts. That's not my problem. 
LS case is my problem. I mean, what I'm saying is, if the 
Jaintiff is too busy with the other case, that's not 
Seething I can deal with. Plaintiff chose to file this case 
*ct we're going to keep it moving. 
So as far as substantial compliance, I find there 
^"substantial compliance with the meet and confer rule. I 
~-"nd that at this point in this litigation 'for the plaintiff 
r^iow in December, have finally filed what the parties are 
,-t •* 
^ ^
a n 9 a supplement to expert reports that were due on 
^ptember 8, that's not satisfactory and I don't find that 
defendant in this matter should have to wait until after 
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the first of the year to finally get what should have been 
filed on September 8 in a timely manner after the Court gave 
the plaintiff four more months to do what the Court now wants 
to have - or what the plaintiff now wants to have 
accomplished by the first of the year. So, for those reasons 
I'm going to grant the motion. 
As to attorney's fees, I don't find it's 
appropriate under the rules to surprise Mr. Christensen with 
a request for attorney's fees at this state and so I'm going 
to deny the request for attorney's fees. 
And as to prejudice or harm to the defendant, I do 
base my decision in this matter on the fact that the 
defendant is harmed. I find that there is a willful failure 
on the plaintiff to carry this case forward- and to obey the 
orders of the court, with the Court having given the 
plaintiff more time over the objection of the defendant. 
But, I find that a request for attorney's fees at this point 
based on bad faith is ill timed and lately timed and I'm not 
going to take an additional motion .on it. That was the 
choice that the defendant made in filing the motion. 
Okay, I have another haring at 10:30 that's 
starting in five minutes if the gentleman shows up but let's 
move on quickly. If he comes, all we're doing is taking his 
agreement on a divorce and we may break. I have a meeting at 
noon that I have to be at. So let's move to the other issue 
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